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PREFACE 
This thesis is primarily concerned with variation of 
desired executive incentive package mix with changes in 
stockholder size. The resulting models allow changes in 
incentive mix desires as a result of merger to be examined. 
Appropriate action on the part of the acquiring company is 
then possible before the key executives leave the 
organization. 
The merger movement has passed the crest of its most 
recent surge; however, it is still very much alive. As 
long as there are those wishing to sell their companies and 
those willing to buy them, some form of merger activity will 
continue. 
The models are based on data obtained from "small" 
manufacturing companies and can serve as a starting point 
for future studies in the areas of desired incentive mix 
and changes of desired mix as a result of merger. Some of 
the pitfalls in obtaining data from the small business 
executive have been found allowing better predictive models 
to be made in the future. This will provide future re-
search, a solid base on which to work. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my 
special gratitude to my graduate adviser, Dr. E. J. 
Ferguson for his help, guidance, and encouragement in the 
preparation of this thesis. Additionally, Dr. v. S. 
Haneman, Dr. G. T. Stevens, and Dr. T. B. Auer have made 
valuable contributions as members of my committee. Their 
criticism, suggestions, and ideas have been of great value. 
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to the late 
Professor Wilson J. Bentley for hi~ guidance and help 
throughout my studies at Oklahoma State University. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The principle objective of this thesis is the develop-
ment of a series of models relating company size, as deter-
mined by the number of stockholders, to desired executive 
incentive package mix. Four incentives: (1) stock options, 
(2) bonuses (all types), (3) salary, and (4) status (company 
car, office, etc.) make ap the models' components. The 
models may be used in the minimizing of dissatisfaction 
resulting from changes in the desired incentive package mix 
of acquired company executives. A merger of the executive's 
company may cause his desired incentive mix to change. The 
resulting dissatisfaction may cause the loss of the acquired 
executives if not alleviated. It is assumed that the key 
executive is needed and the acquiring company desires to 
keep him. 
Because of deep personal involvement, a merger can be a 
traumatic experience for the small businessman, far over-
shadowing his perception of his future. In addition, the 
unfamiliarity of the new organization and its greater size 
lessen his ability to verbalize either his present or his 
future desires in regard to incentives. The acquiring com-
pany has its own perception of what the acquired executivevs 
1 
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incentive package should be. Unfortunately, the two percep-
tions are not always the same. By understanding the small-
company executive's desired incentive mix before the merger 
and what executives desire as a group after their companies 
have gone through mergers, the acquiring company can pre-
.scribe an ultimately acceptable incentive package at the 
start and do the selling required. The models may also be 
used as an aid in determining which companies to approach if 
only one type of incentive package is available. 
The models are based initially on a search of the lit-
erature, interviews, and personal experiences. Data from 
several studies are used to quant.;i:fy the models. Two groups 
of executives are examined for their desired incentive mix: 
(1) the small independent company executive and (2) the 
acquired company executive. The·independent groups' models 
vary with the number of stockholders allowing them to be 
subdividec;i. 
Actual magnitudes of individual incentives are a sensi-
tive ·area, hence percentages of total incentive packages 
were used. Percentages also eliminate company-to-company 
and industry-to-industry variations. A study using data 
from approximately 70 key executives was used as a basis for 
this portion of the thesis. The independent companies with 
2-20 owners, the independent companies.with J0-1000. own:er~, 
and the acquired companies with 100-12,000 owners form the 
three segments of each of the incentive models. For pur-- .: 
poses of data handling, each . segment was broken into ten data 
cells. Linear regression was used on various segments of 
the data to create the models. The hypothesized regression 
lines were tested for significance of regression through 
the use of 11 t 11 tests (22, p. 20), and the·residuaL·sunis of 
squares were tested to verify how well the models fit the 
means of the data cells.(22, p. 29). 
The mergers discussed in this thesis involve only the 
willing acquisition. Tender offers, raiders, and takeovers 
are seldom mentioned in regard to the smaller owner-manager 
business. Additionally, the thesis is limited to those 
companies that are basically "small" having from 100-3,000 
employees and are manufacturing companies. 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis involves a number of areas and is 
spelled out in more detail below~ but basically it is: 
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Incentive packages desired by "key" executives vary in 
composition or mix with changes in the number of stock-
holders. Further, the desired incentive mix of acquired-
company executives does not vary with the number of 
stockholders in the organization and is a different mix from 
what the independent executives desire. 
It is hypothesized in this dissertation that: 
(1) Status is of little interest to executives 
in independent companies having few stock-
holders and also to those executives in 
companies having larger numbers of 
stockholders. However, there is a middle 
group to which status does assume impor-
tance, therefore, a convex upward curve 
of desired status results. Acquired-
company executives have a desire for status 
that is independent of the number of 
stockholders. 
(2) Bonuses follow the same general pattern as 
status; that is, the independent-company 
executives in companies having few stock-
holders and those having many stockholders 
have little desire for the bonus incentive. 
The middle group has a greater desire for 
the bonus incentive than the two extremes, 
again giving a convex upward curve of 
incentive desire. The acquired-company 
executives have a desire for bonuses that 
is independent of the number of 
stockhold~rs. 
(J) Stock options follow the same pattern as the 
bonus and status incentives for both 
independent company executives and acquired 
company executives. 
(4) Salary 1 being the remaining incentive, is of 
greatest importance to the executives in the 
companies having few stockholders and those 
having many stockholders. The salary incentive 
4 
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is not as important to the middle group as 
it is to executives in companies having 
very few and very many stockholders. The 
acquired company e~ecutive has a rather 
uniform expectation that varies little with 
the number of stockholders. 
Incentive Change as a Result of Merger 
The management in an acquiring company has a major prob-
lem in determining what to do with the incentive package of 
a key executive in a company they wish to acquire. They 
must either change it or leave it alone, and a strong case 
can be made for each. 
The desire to change the incentive package is particu-
larly strong in cases where only a few of the key executives 
were major stockholders and the company sold out for a 
rather large amount of stock or where the existing total 
incentive package was extremely generous. In fact, a common 
feeling is: Never give a key executive enough to let him 
retire out from under an' organization when the going gets 
rough. All too often the president of an acquired organiza-
tion has a larger incentive package than the man he will 
report to in the acquiring firm. Albrook (J, p. 162) points 
out: 
The actual control functions, moreover, are in the 
hands of a large, entrenched middle management, 
usually operating by standard procedures. When a 
· new company is acquired, there is a strong tendency 
to force it into the established routine. And 
sometimes there is resentment among middle managers 
against outsiders (who may have been given better 
salaries of stock options) that reinforces their 
determination to clamp down on the interlopers. 
Just a.s it has been found impossible to keep blue co 1-
lar employees from finding out each otheros salary, it is 
impossible to keep division executives from finding out how 
much each is paid. Psychologists point out that a major 
source of anxiety, frustration, and antagonism is the feel-
ing that one is being treated differently from others. The 
position .of being in a number of different industries and 
owning companies with a wide range of sizes compounds the 
problem for the conglomerate. Arch Patton (7 1 pp. 690-691) 
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has pointed out a number of relationships that tend to force 
use of dissimilar incentive plans: 
First, large companies tend to pay their execu-
tives more than smaller ones. Second, the salary 
of the chief executive is instrumental in regu-
lating the pay of subordinate executives. Third 9 
the level of compensation for comparable positions 
among industries varies widely. Fourth 9 the pay 
level relationship among various management func-
tions is reasonably constant from industry to 
industry. 
In addition, if the parent company wants to tie the size of 
a portion of the incentive package to some measure of per-
formance, Patton°s (60~ p. 96) 1966 study of executive pay 
detected few instances where there was a positive correla-
tion between the level of top management pay and return on 
sales or invested capital. 
Many articles on acquisition techniques recommend the 
use of a uniform incentive package, but most authors then 
back off and indicate that special plans may be acceptable 
if there is a well-defined organizational breakdown. 
The general company compensation program should be 
reviewed early in the postmerger period. In most 
circumstances, the compensation packages of both 
companies--salary, bonus, options, and fringe bene-
fi ts--should be rationali.zed on a common basis. 
This establishes a one-company atmosphere, elimi-
nates a potential source of divisiveness, and per-
mits intercompany transfers. A common compensation 
program need not, of course, rule out special 
compensation features or even separate salary 
scales that may be desirable in a company with 
sharply diversified divisions (70, p~ 8). 
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Litton {75, p. 60 ), considered the 11granddaddyllof the conglom-
erates, does not believe ~n the uniform plan, but does 
believe in the "carrot-and-stick" wherever possible • 
••• there is no standard compensation system at 
Litton,' but many· different ones, each tailored 
to its own special circumstances. Nor is there 
even a standa~d divisional accounting system. 
What is ;standard, however, is the strict account-
abili ty.!that goes along with Litton's brand of 
autonomy. In short, a Litton manager is expected 
to perform. 'You get a guy,' says Gordon Murphy, 
1 make hi~ unit s~lf-contained, and set a goal. 
If he can hack it, you make his reward propor-
tionate to the goal.' 
And if he cannot 'hack' it? 'Then, 'adds 
Murphy coolly, 'you go cold turkey and get 
another guy.' 
Changing of any incentive package mix creates problems, 
yet incentives tied to performance may not be present in the 
existing package to the extent desired by the acquiring 
.company. Reduction of one incentive in order to increase 
another is difficult since the value of the various incen-
' tives is a subjective evaluation on the part of the 
individual (47, p. 59). Present incentives also have more 
value for the individual than those in the future, so salary 
versus stock options and bonuses are not strictly comparable. 
Incentives and Stockholders' Size 
The executive in a small independent company is aware 
of his upper position in the hierarchy as it is relatively 
small and visible to him. The number of others sharing the 
same relative level are of interest to him and the need to 
identify himself in this group is of importance to him as 
the group increases in size. Conversely, when the peer 
8 
group is large and management is separated from ownership, 
the executive does not have some of the identification needs 
that exist in smaller groups, but does have identification 
needs with a different group. Size of the company and 
domination over others have importance, but such relation-
ships are not linear. 
Status is the primary means of identifying one's posi-
tion in a hierarchy, however, status in the broad sense is 
composed of more than just the items normally considered. 
Stock options and bonuses, although monetary incentives, 
are also status incentives in that the eligibility for them 
implies a certain position in the hierarchy. The award of 
them and identification with the success of the company 
provides motivation other than simple increased worth of 
the executive. The pride-of-ownership incentive is as 
important as the desire for wealth. However, when such 
incentives are tied to division or company performance 1 the 
executive cannot identify his contribution if the company 
ownership is too diffuse. Too large a peer group and too 
many eligibles for such incentives reduce their status 
value and raise questions over their ability to motivate. 
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The large company executive continues to receive a sig-
nificant amount of his compensation through company-tied 
incentives because of the risk reduction it has for the 
company. In poor times, the executive's bonus is lowered 
allowing a greater percentage of the profits to be paid to 
the owners (stockholders) rather than to the managers 
(executives). Although the executive does not like to have 
his compensation dictated by a group of "outsiders" 1 the 
owners (stockholders) are showing a greater and greater 
interest in just how the companys 1 managers are compensated. 
CHAPTER II 
MERGERS AND SMALL BUSINESSES 
In order to better understand the need for a model or a 
series of models allowing changes in incentive desires to be 
predicted 1 merger trends and their impact on small busi-
nesses should be examined. 
The small company will play a larger and larger role in 
the acquisition programs of the merger oriented companies. 
There are simply not enough good qualityj medium size compa-
nies to satisfy the demand for acquisitions. By the final 
frenzy of the late 1960s, the field had been pretty well 
picked over. The demand is such that there is now consider-
able interest in unmerging or spinning off earlier acquisi-
tions and selling them to some other acquisition oriented 
management or even setting them up on their own. In fact 1 
the magazine Mergers and Acquisitions now devotes a full 
section to this activity. 
Sales and earnings of many acquired divisions never 
lived up to expectations; and in other cases, man-
agements of acquired companies have left en masse, 
leaving the parent firm stuck with a company no one 
knows how to run. Other reasons behind the surge 
toward qdeconglomeration 1 include the government's 
continued attacks on conglomeration in the form of 
antitrust suits (53, p. 58). 
Another reason behind the acquisition of smaller companies 
is the companies which were originally acquired by the 
1 () 
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parent company are often instructed to make further, smaller 
acquisitions of their own. Such a program is necessary if 
the gradual erosion of importance artd autonomy of the origi-
nal acquired company is to be prevented. Often, these 
smaller mergers are handled with less finesse and become 
buyouts with complete loss of key personnel. Reid (61, p. 
17) presents data on the acquisition of manufacturing firms 
with over 10 million in assets and those under 10 million. 
His data (in Figure 1) shows the importance of the small 
business in the current merger trend. 
Trends in the legal aspects of mergers tend to increase 
the attractiveness of small companies as they have less 
impact on elimination of competition. 
The FTC has announced that, in determining 
whether to challenge acquisitions and mergers 
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it expedites 
procedures when the amalgamations appear to be: 
'Mer~ers which may substantially lessen 
[existing] competition through horizontal combi-
nation of significant competitors. 
'Mergers which may substantially lessen 
potential competition. 
'Mergers of a vertical nature [involving] 
significant suppliers and customers which may 
result in substantial foreclosure or raise entry 
barriers. 
'Mergers threatening significant increases 
in barriers to the entry of new competition, 
conferring undue competitive advantages or 
threatening to set in motion a merger trend whose 
cumulative effects may be anticompetitive' (73, p~ 36). 
Small Firms in Mergers 
One often overlooked consideration in the successful 
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acquisition of the small firm is the amount of time it takes 
to manage it. One executive pointed out that it takes just 
as long to handle a small company as it does a large one. 
Since the staff is limited in the parent companyrs office, 
it makes sense not to acquire a firm unless it is large 
enough to justify the time spent in the acquisition and the 
ongoing management of it. Too many companies seem to forget 
the first cost is not the last cost. " 1 This little group 
of companies didn't cost much to buy, but since 1961 I 
reckon they have lost us $10 million, plus the drain on 
management time'" (40~ p. 92). 
Royal Little, former chairman of Textron Incorporated, 
feels that the large firms should not acquire small busi-
nesses and should concentrate on the management of larger 
companies. The importance of allowing the management a real 
piece of the action is emphasized by him. 
Little shows the same imperturable nature, 
discussing thi changing nature of the conglomer-
ate that he did so much to invent. He does not 
find it surprising that many such companies have 
been approaching Little & Casler (the firm he 
runs with ex-Textron associate Lester Casler) 
with.offers to unmerge smaller subsidiaries. 
Says Little: ir think that all of the big 
conglomerates will ultimately find that they had 
better concentrate on management of the larger 
divisions instead of those doing $5-million, or 
$6-million. These units may be perfectly good 
earners, but it's better to sell them off, or 
give the managers a chance to go into business 
themselves' (46, p. 42). 
Short (71, pp. 74-75) points out that small, closely 
held corporations, proprietorships, and partnerships have a 
fear of merger. A study is reported concerning small firms 
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grossing less than five million dollars per year. The find-
ings revealed a fear of business combination when control is 
lost. Short points out that the owneFs of these small 
firms are usually also the founders and administrators of 
their businesses. Strong sentimental and psychic attachment 
had been formed with the company. These attachments would 
be threatened by merger and the loss of them could not be 
offset by changes in other incentives. According to Short 7 
the average small business owner-manager sees little differ-
ence between absorption and liquidation. 
Definitions 
It is necessary to de£ine some basic terminology upon 
which an understanding of this thesis can be based. 
1. The horizontal merger is one involving firms 
which are engaged in principally the same 
industry. Horizontal mergers have received 
the largest amount of antitrust attention 
since they directly involve the elimination 
of competition in a given area. 
2. The vertical merger is one involving firms in 
which one _supplied the other with materials 
and services. The companies are at different 
levels in the chain from raw materials to 
marketing to the ultimate customer. These 
mergers have received increasing attention as 
in the duPont-General Motors case. 
J. The circular merger involves product extension. 
It allows a firm to use the same distribution 
channels with nonsimilar products or services. 
4. The concentric merger involves a common thread 
in the relationship of the firms, which in 
turn creates lltwo plus two equals five". To 
achieve these multiplicative rather than 
merely additive effects requires a complemen-
tary relationship which reflects the degree of 
fit between the operations joined. The con-
glomerates highly tout but rarely achieve this 
synergistic effect. 
5. The conglomerate merger is one in which there 
are no apparent similarities in producing or 
marketing activities. The typical diversifica-
tion acquisition of a company is of this type. 
The conglomerate merger is the most popular 
of the merger types at present because of its 
glamour, immunity (until recently) from regu-
lation, and the desire on the part of companies 
to diversify. 
6. A pure merger occurs when one or more companies 
are absorbed by an existing company. The 
separate existence of the absorbed firm ceases 
when the transaction is consumated. 
7. An amalgamation is the organization of a new 
corporation for the purpose of absorbing two 
15 
or more companies. The uniting companies are 
voluntarily extinguished. The new entity takes 
over both the firms' liabilities and 
properties. 
8. An acquisition concerns one company's purchase 
of another's total or controlling interest, 
usually in the form of stock, and the subsequent 
operation of the purchased company as a separate 
division or subsidiary. 
9. Sale of assets occurs if a company sells its 
assets to another firm and then goes out of 
existence without retaining any bartered inter-
est in the acquirer. 
16 
The term, merger, is used in this thesis to denote the com-
bination of two or more firms regardless of the final 
corporate form. 
History of the Merger Movement 
Mergers and business combinations are not a new 
American phenbmenon. There have been three distinct move-
ments since 1890 and each has had unique motivating charac-
teristics. The first wave occurred between 1890 and 1904; 
the second began at the end of World War I and continued 
through the 1920s; and the third began during the latter 
part of World War II and continued until the end of the 
1960s. Figure 2 shows these three movements. The data for 
17 
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this illustration was obtained from Reid's Mergers, Managers 
~ the Economy (62, Table 2.1). 
First Merger Wave 
The wave of the 1890s was the first and the shortest of 
the three merger.waves. The main thrust was from 1898 
until 1902. During this five year period, there were 2,653 
reported mergers with 1,268 reported in 1899 alone. In 
relation to the economy of that day, this was a considerable 
amount of activity in a brief period of time. Of 318 impor-
tant combines in existence in 1903 (total capital of 7.2 
billion dollars), at least 236 (accounting for 6 billion 
dollars) had been incorporated since January 1, 1898 (62, 
p. 32). The mergers of this period were consolidations 
encompassing large numbers of firms in the same industry. 
The purpose was elimination of competition and establishment 
of a dominant firm. These early consolidation mergers led 
to the linking of mer.gers and monopoly in the public mind. 
The vast majority of these mergers were of the horizon-
tal type. There were circular and vertical aspects to some 
of them, but most economists refer to this as the era of the 
horizontal merger. 
Over the years, the following listed factors have been 
critical in cases testing horizontal mergers: 
1. The degree of concentration in the relevant 
market. 
2. The rank and shares of the acquiring and 
acquired (companies) in the ••• market. 
3. Changes, and particularly decreases, in the 
number of companies operating in an expand-
ing market. 
4. Changes in barriers to entry. 
5. The elimination of a major independent company 
from a generally oligopolistic market (73, 
p. 20) • 
Second Merger Wave 
19 
The second wave crested in the latter part of the 
1920s. From 1925 through 1930, there were 5,846 mergers, 
with 1,245 reported in 1929 (62, p. 56). In sheer numbers, 
the second wave was over twice the size of the first one. 
In this five-year period, thirty-seven large firms merged 
with total assets of nearly 5.4 billion dollars, close to 
the total of 7.2 billion dollars for the total activity of 
the earlier wave. Rather than the vast consolidations of 
the first wave 1 the mergers in the second wave were more 
one-at-a-time, or piece meal, and therefore less spectacular. 
This movement saw the rise of the vertical and circular 
types of merger. The horizontal merger declined in use 
since consolidation was not a significant factor. Possible 
motives for the use of vertical integration were to achieve 
technical gains from integration, free the firm from depend-
ence on other firms for raw materials, and to consolidate 
sales and distributing organizations. 
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Governmental concern with vertical mergers rests on 
control of limited sources of supply at one stage of produc-
tion which may serve as a barrier to the entry of other 
firms at successive stages. A merger of companies operating 
in vertically related markets is vulnerable to antitrust 
action if either market is concentrated. 
Third Merger Wave 
The most recent merger movement began in 1955 and has 
been the most persistent of the three waves. During the 
period of 1955 through 1966, there were 9,834 mergers (62, 
p. 74) . 
The present trend is different in that the circular and 
conglomerate approaches are used more often than in the 
earlier waves. The mergers are aimed primarily at diversi-
fication in which a firm enters into entirely new lines of 
business. This type of merger may be the forerunner of a 
new approach to business. The corporation may have a dura-
bility lasting beyond its commitment to any given line of 
business and change its product mix to match its perception 
of future markets. This switching is most easily done by 
the use of mergers. 
Concern about conglomerate mergers, from an anti-
trust perspective, has generally emphasized two 
issues: the overall concentration of asset owner-
ship and the competitive superiority of conglomer-
ates over single-market companies (73, p. 36). 
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Mergers' Successes and Failures 
It has been widely assumed that mergers were a profit-
able and successful means of expansion. Attempts have been 
made by a number of authors to determine how successful 
mergers have been in terms of profitability and the majority 
of the results are not encouraging. 
Dewing (38, p. 8) was the first to study the merger 
movement of the 1890s. He selected thirty-five companies 
that were national in character, had published reliable 
financial reports and met certain other qualifications. 
His first test indicated that earnings of the separate 
companies before consolida.tion were eighteen per cent great-
er than the combined earnings of the first year after con-
solidation. Dewing 9 s second test resulted in bankers and 
promoters estimating a thirty-three per cent earnings im-
provement as a result of consolidation. The estimated 
earnings proved to be fifty per cent higher than the actual 
earnings of the first year. The third test showed the 
earnings in the tenth year after consolidation were seven 
per cent below that df the first year after consolidation 
showing that even with time profitability did not reach its 
original level. 
After Dewing came a number of different studies; prac-
tically all of them reaphed conclusions similar to Dewing's. 
The National Industrial Conference Board studied 48 consoli-
dations from 1900 to 1913 by looking at the rate of return 
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on capital invested and security prices of the firms. The 
Board arrived at four major conclusions: 
1) When whole industries have been subject 
to stagnation, the consolidations went down with 
the rest. 
2) Industrial consolidations have not been 
able to avoid sharp decreases in profits in 
years of depressed economic activity. 
3) When industrial consolidations have 
burdened themselves with an unmanageable capital 
structure, they have lost their flexibility and 
thus forfeited their industrial leadership. 
4) Business combinations are no substitute 
for effective management (38, p. 10). 
Johan Bjorksten, a management adviser of 
Madison, Wisconsin, was not very scientific, but 
is nevertheless revealing. This study consisted 
of a survey of published articles about more 
than five thousand mergers during the period 1955-
1965. He concluded that 17 percent of the mergers, 
or about one out of every six, were known failures 
(62, p. 94). 
In an unpublished study of 120 acquisitions 
made during the period 1960-1965, Boaz, Allen and 
Hamilton, Inc., a management consulting firm, 
found that 11 percent were later sold or liquidated 
and that another 25 percent were judged by manage-
ment to have been of doubtful worth. Forbes 
reported on this study as follows: vwe asked 
executives what seems to me to be the one meaning-
ful question,v explained Conrad Jones, who heads 
up the New York office for Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton. vwe asked them, VIf you had a chance, 
would you do it again?v In only 64% of the cases 
was the answer 9 VYesv (62, p. 38). 
Kelly (38, pp. 70-71) compared the performance of twenty 
merging firms for five years prior to a major merger with 
their performance for five years after the merger. The 
merging firms were compared with a "similar" firm with 
little or no merger activity to determine relative perform-
ance. Success was determined by comparing the performance 
of matched pairs of firms in similar industries. The con-
clusions of this study are not surprising. The key to a 
successful or unsuccessful merger policy is the price paid 
for the acquisition. 
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One study used in this thesis based success of a merger 
on the satisfaction of the acquired company personnel. 
Unfortunately, a high amount of subjectivity was attached to 
the answers. The questions were concerned with the satis-
faction of the individual, the efficiency of the individual 
and the resulting competitive position of the company. The 
full questionnaire is in Appendix A. Three types of mergers 
were examined, ranging from simple conglomeration to dis-
solution. A downward shift in all the categories 
individual satisfaction, individual efficiency, and corpo-
rate competitive ability of the acquired executives and 
their companies was perceived by the respondents, as the 
acquiring companyvs control over the acquired company was 
increased. The greatest downward shift occurred in the 
three categories when the acquired companyvs management was 
removed. Apparently, such an action is viewed as only 
slightly better than liquidation. 
CHAPTER III 
DIFFERENCES IN SELLER'S AND 
BUYERVS VIEWPOINTS 
In order to appreciate why the executives involved in 
a merger have a difficult time in expressing their desire 
for various incentive packages, the differences in view-
point between the buyers and sellers of a company should be 
examined. Basically, there are two types of executives that 
are involved in the sales side of the transaction: (1) 
owner-investors whose ownership is financial in nature and 
' (2) owner-managers who in addition to having a financial 
interest are directly concerned with business policies and 
decisions. 
The owner-investor sells because he prefers to have his 
investment in the firm changed to some other form. The 
owner-manager has more complex reasons. Kinney (4, p. 14) 
has pointed out that 11 80 per cent of the operating concerns 
in the United States are owned by a single individual and 
that many of the remaining 20 per cent are firms with two or 
three owners." Clearly, most small businesses tend to fall 
in the category of owner-manager type firms. 
Most publications point out the business reasons for 
selling and do not emphasize the personal ones. Many 
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observers feel that there must be a problem or the company 
would not be for sale. Mr. Robert Chambers (16), formerly 
president of Magna Engineering Company, stated: 
The man I am most envious of is the president 
of a profitable growing company who: 
1. Owns his company or has completely 
compatible co-owners. 
2. Has adequate capital not only for current 
operations but also to finance a growth 
program that will challenge his young and 
capable executive team. 
J. Has resolved all his personal estate 
problems as well as those of other 
principal stockholders. 
Undoubtedly such a man averages no more than 
four hours a day at his office, the balance spent 
either on the golf course, with his family, or 
traveling in foreign lands. His brow is unfurrowed, 
his shoulders erect, his hair jet black. Such a man 
should cosult a psychiatrist if he entertains the 
slightest thought of selling his company. 
Seller.vs Viewpoint 
Some of the reasons behind selling are (1) taxation, 
(2) management problems, (3) capital considerations, (4) 
product line, and (5) fear. 
Taxation 
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One study reported that the opinions of the managements 
of 401 companies that sold out or merged between 1955 and 
1959 indicated that estate tax and valuation problems were 
the leading consideration in the decisions of owners of a 
closely held business to sell out or merge (11, p. 167). 
Taxation was reported to be of substantial significance in 
252 or 63 per cent of the 401 cases. Out of the 252 
26 
cases mentioned above, 207 were concerned over uncertainties 
in valuation of ownership interests, 177 sold out or merged 
at least partly to obtain marketable stock to get around the 
problem of valuation uncertainties, and 128 we~e concerned 
about the cost of litigation. Estate planning, therefore, 
is a factor in mergers since it is impossible to predict 
accurately the valuation that will be placed on the business 
at the time of the owner's death. 
Management Problems 
There are many types of management problems which cause 
owners to desire to sell their company. Some of these are: 
1. Dissension in the top management may occur 
when the original team has time to plan for 
the future. Attitudes, aims, etc., may change 
drastically when success allows the entrepre-
neurs to look at other than the challenge of 
building the company. 
2. The management may find that they have not 
built an organization in which younger men 
have a chance to fulfill top job responsibil-
ities. When the management wants out, th~re 
is no one to fill their shoes. 
J. The company may be getting too large for the 
few qualified key executives to handle. The 
management team may have neither the talents 
nor the inclination for administration of what 
they have built. 
Capital Considerations 
In the first years of a business, the profits are 
usually small. The profit record is a major guide in 
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borrowing from banks. As the business expands, additional 
capital is needed either from the profits or from borrowing. 
New projects needed to remain competitive may have to be 
shelved if no additional capital is available. However, 
in Macevs and Montgomery's (48, p. 52) study, they did not 
find a single company that had to sell because of a lack of 
money. Other methods than selling out were available such 
as issuing stock; however, concern over equity dilution and 
an inadequate sales price for the stock were given as rea-
sons for not doing this. 
Product Line 
The effect of a narrow or unbalanced product line is 
shown by the problems that the electronics and aerospace 
industries are having during the early 1970s. Dependence 
on one customer, the government, has created great risks for 
them. When the small firm has a narrow product line, a 
limited ability to enter new areas, and is confronted by 
large competitors with broad integrated product lines, the 
small firm may be wise to sell out. Under the weapons sys-
tem concept, many items that were previously bought as 
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individual units and assembled by either the military or a 
contractor are now bought as an over-all assembled item. 
The prime contractor, regardless of required subcontractor 
programs, does all he can 11 in-house11 • The small, narrow 
product line company simply does not have adequate ability 
to take on such large projects as the prime contractor and 
cannot compete adequately in. "make or buy decisions". 
Fear 
Practically all of these business reasons are actually 
some form of fear of the future (48, p. JJ). In fact, one 
study found that in most, but not all, cases studied of 
mergering companies that the one common factor that charac-
terized the decision to sell out was fear. Fear is not a 
socially acceptable emotion to express; therefore, the prac-
tice of disguising the true nature of the seller's motiva-
tion is a common feature of the negotiating phase of the 
merger. The more knowledgeable merger oriented firms are 
aware of this problem and,for that reason usually carefully 
examine any merger candidates. 
Most of the economic or business reasons just given can 
be re-expressed as a fear of one sort or the other. A major 
fear is that the work of a lifetime may be lost through some 
unforeseeable event. The entrepreneur in this case is 
putting his own well-being ahead of that of his company and 
is willing at least for the present to put his security 
ahead of his pride of ownership. The usually limited number 
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of owners in a small firm is an expression of its limited 
appeal as an investment. Small firms have a difficult time 
11 going public" with their stock. The limited market greatly 
affects the liquidity of the ownervs investment in the com-
pany. In order to convert the investment into cash or other 
investments, the investor must find a buyer or liquidate the 
firm. Liquidation usually does not bring an adequate price 
and goes against the growth oriented grain of the 
entrepreneur. 
The fear that a business and technology have become too 
complex is another common fear. Automation, use of comput-
ers, etc., tend to convince the owners that things are now 
changing too fast for them to keep up. Such rapidly 
changing technology may even allow a competitor to upstage 
the company. If this happens, the owners may be forced to 
make a sizesable investment in new technology just to stay 
even. Such investments are hard to justify to those owners 
who are afraid of the future as it requires some of their 
lifetime savings to be invested in an uncertainty. The 
possibility that a competitor may merge with a larger 
company or conglomerate which will then bank roll the 
competitor into a dominant position is a corollary. In 
fact, this is one of the advantages claimed for conglomer-
ates, the transfusion of financial,technical,or administra-
tive aid is one of the inducements for a firm to merge. 
The fear of loss of key personnel because the compensa-
tion package is not adequate is also expressed in the 
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Mace-Montgomery (48, p. 33) study. With stock openly 
traded in large companies, the chance to participate in the 
company through stock options is available. Small compa-
nies do not have this advantage and the stock is of limited 
liquidity since no market exists, making ownership unattrac-
tive to the key executives. 
Buyer's Viewpoint 
The five primary·objectives of the buyer are (1) diver-
sification, (2) market expansion, (J) improvement of compet,.:., 
itive position, (4) immunity from depression, and (5) the 
desire for power. 
Diversification 
Diversification is the term most often linked with the 
curr.ent ·merger movement. The rapid change of society and 
its demands require that a company, to be successful, must 
not concentrate on one i tern or service. The end r.esul t may 
be a number of subsidiaries completely dissimilar in their 
products and services. 
In diversification, management of the acquiring com-
pany thinks more in terms of long-range, no-risk programs 
and is careful to take extra precautions in view of the fact 
that the profit life of a product today varies from five to 
fifteen years and often less. Diversification-minded man-
agement seeks constantly to arrange mergers with firms that 
show growth potential in new areas. 
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Market Expansion 
Very often the main problem is not one of the potential 
market changing, but of reaching the full potential of the 
market well in advance of its decline. Diversification is 
not implicit, though the end result may be a form of diver-
sification if the acquired firm deals in different products 
distributed through the same channels. 
Improvement of Competitive Position 
Savings can be accomplished if the acquired organiza-
tion can be tied to the acquiring company to such an extent 
that duplicate posts or jobs can be eliminated. This is 
difficult to do in the conglomerate form if each company is 
to continue its separate organization. The act of tighten-
ing may actually hurt profits in such cases. 
Pooling of effort can result in savings. Research and 
development can be combined to some extent. Marketing can 
receive products to fill out the product line. A computer 
can be utilized by several divisions for various efforts. 
Synergy is hoped for but seldom achieved in these efforts. 
The required separation for management and control prevents 
its full realization. 
The liquidation of an acquired company can result in 
substantial savings in both key personnel and in equipment. 
The form of acquisition and its goals must be considered 
when acquiring to improve competitive position. 
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Depression Immunity 
When the economy of the 'nation suffers a slump I certain 
industries suffer more than others. To alleviate this fear 
of impending crippling or perhaps death of their business, 
many such firms get themselves a hard-times crutch in the 
form of a merger with a stable item producer. 
Until the 1969-1971 recession, many of the conglomer-
ates believed that their organizations were recession proof, 
however, this has not been the case. The recession-
depression use of acquisitions may help, but not totally 
prevent loss of business. 
Power 
Many organizations are one-man shows. In fact, concern 
has been expressed about the future of conglomerates when 
the founder retires. 
More often doubtless than is commonly sup-
posed, the basic purpose in effecting combina-
tions has been psychological rather than economic. 
Ambitious and successful business and industrial 
leaders took pride and pleasure in becoming rail-
way kings, monarchs of finance; builders of vast 
industrial empires. Such combinations gratified 
the race-old instinct of self-assertion and dom-
ination over others. To organize a great combi-
nation was at once to give eloquent testimony of 
creative genius and also to provide a means of 
satisfying one's desire for power (82, p. 19). 
It is important that the differences in viewpoint and 
purpose of the acquiring company and the acquired company qe 
recognized. The desire to alleviate the fears that the 
owner-manager has is uppermost in his mind. Since the main 
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desire is to alleviate this fear, other considerations are 
secondary and tend to be brushed aside or easily covered by 
some simple statement. He does not fully examine the 
acquiring company and its goals as related to his company. 
The management of the acquiring company is interested 
in growth of the over-all organization. Acquired companies 
or divisions are of interest not as individual organizations 
but only in what they can contribute to the whole. The 
division that does not perform up to expectations may be 
modified, liquidated, or spun-off. The chairman of the 
board of one major conglomerate when asked what steps were 
taken to help divisions which lost money replied, "We have 
no divisions that lose money." Such an impersonal approach 
to the future of an acquisition is not what the owners of a 
small company want. Most entrepreneurs do not want to see 
their life work modified, liquidated, or spun-off. 
CHAPTER IV 
KEY EXECUTIVES IN INDEPENDENT AND 
ACQUIRED COMPANIES 
Presthus (61) defined nine major structural character-
istics of large organizations which constitute his bureau-
cratic model, an ideal type of all large organizations. 
Although the small company may not have all of these bureau-
cratic characteristics, the addition of it to an acquiring 
company does not eliminate theirs and, in fact, reinforces 
many of them. These characteristics are size specializa-
tion, hierarchy, status authority, oligarchy, cooptation, 
rationality, and efficiency. 
According to Presthus 1 theory, there are three types of 
individual reactions to the imposition of a 'bureaucratic 
structure. The "upward mobile" fully accepts the organiza-
tional structure. He identifies strongly with the organiza-
tion. The upward mobile is roughly defined as one who can 
take seriously the status system of big organizations. 
The "indifferent" regards organizations as calculated 
systems. of frustration, he does not compete for the promised 
rewards. The indifferent pattern is the typical pattern for 
most of those in an organization. It is suggested that a 
large proportion of them have been alienated by the 
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structural conditions of big organization. Indifference is 
manifested by a desire to find rewards through his extra-
vocational orientation. Work is a method to obtain satis-
factions not related to work. 
The third classification Presthus uses is the 
"ambivalent". The ambivalent needs the rewards and recogni-
tion of the organization, but is unwilling to blindly accept 
the system. Rationality alone provides his compelling 
standard. The role normally played by the ambivalent is 
that of the specialist; he honors theory, knowledge, and 
skill. His intellectual interests are narrow and deep, his 
intelligence markedly superior to that of extroverts. 
Personal goals of this group are usually primary. 
The executive in a company with very few stockholders 
avoids many of these pitfalls. He does not need the status 
system to identify his position; he is, to a large part, above 
the organizational structure. The company is his baby and 
its growth is satisfying; hence, work is not a method to 
obtain other satisfactions. He is the system or can modify 
it so he is not asked to blindly accept it. 
There have been many comments made about executives 
H"banking their fires" after a merger. New, outside interests 
are often mentioned; this, along with Presthus' comments, 
certainly raise the possibility that executives become in-
different or ambivalent after a merger if they cannot find 
a suitable incentive mix that fits their new position in a 
new hierarchy. 
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The ambivalent being somewhat of a loner and his sensi-
tivity to the need for change seems to fit the small company 
founder who wants to invent and be left alone. It is 
pointed out again and again by Presthus that such an indi-
vidual is uniquely unsuited to the bureaucratic organization. 
One way to ease the pain for a president who 
treasures his autonomy is to place him under the 
supervision of a tolerant executive who can suspend 
the rules of corporate bureaucracy. This is par-
ticularly important for some scientist-entrepreneurs 
who have little interest in management (3, p. 155). 
Blauner (10, pp. 15-34) studied the alienation of the 
blue collar worker in Alienation and Freedom. Four types of 
alienation were found in industry: powerlessness, meaning-
lessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. It is striking 
that although he studied factory workers in industry, much 
of the same forms of alienation are present in the executive 
whose company has been purchased by another, or one in which 
he has little say. 
A person is powerless when he is an object controlled 
and manipulated by other persons or by an impersonal system 
and when he cannot assert himself or modify this domination. 
Meaninglessness reflects a split between the part and 
the whole. This form of alienation occurs when individual 
roles are not seen fitting into the total system of goals of 
the organization. The nonalienated state is understanding 
of the organization's total functioning and activity. 
Rantec sales, Krausz concedes, represented 
only a minute portion of Emerson's half-billion-
dollar business, so he understood why headquarters 
did not always respond to his requests. 'But you 
begin to feel it doesn't make any difference to 
them what happens to you (J, p. 164). 
Isolation suggests the feeling of being in but not of 
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society, a sense of remoteness from the larger social order, 
an absence of loyalties. The nonalienated state is a sense 
of membership and of belonging. 
Self-estrangement occurs when activity becomes a means 
to an end rather than an end in itself. Presthus (61, 
pp. 205-256) also describes this form of alienation as pres-
ent in individuals who are indifferent. The opposite pole 
is involvement, self-expression, and self-actualization. 
With several million dollars of Itek stock, 
Ayer left this year and now his typical weekly 
schedule includes one day consulting for Itek, 
two days raising money for a community hospital 
in Palo Alto, California (where he lives), and 
eight hours of flying instruction to win his 
instrument rating. He also serves as a director 
of four companies, chairman of one other - and 
goes fishing (J, p. 162). 
Often, the managements of the acquiring companies 
accuse the executives of losing their drive and are disap-
pointed when motivational schedules do not work. Several 
respondents to the studies commented on executives that 
seemed "to simply have received too much money all at once, 
and now sit around and want to work on 1 pet 1 projects out-
side of the company." The loss of self-actualization was 
never mentioned. 
Again, the executive in the company with few stock-
holders does not suffer any of these forms of alienation. 
However, as the number of stockholders increase, the execu-
tive becomes more and more of a manager and less and less of 
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an owner. The responsibility is there but the authority is 
in question. The executive can see less and less of an 
impact that his personal efforts have on either the company's 
growth or his own wealth. In short:, at some point the com-
pany becomes filled with organization men. Less there be 
any misunderstanding, the thrust here is not against biggness, 
bureaucracy is highly functional for the larger company 
which is where it is usua.lly found. Only one small company, 
observed by the author, with urider 500 people and originally 
about JO stockholders had a bureaucratic structure; its past 
was filled with near bankruptcies and rescues. At the other 
pole, no large -company was observed that had other t9-an a 
bureaucratic structure. 
The fundamental differences between the entrepreneur 
and the organization man form at least part of the basis for 
the differences in attitude of executives in small companies 
as the number of stoc·kholder.s vary. The company executives 
in those companies with few stockholders are often the 
founders of the company and regard it as a highly emoti.onal 
extension of themselves. Marko· (J6, p. J15) has indicated' 
the problem in his article on minimizing merger risks: 
We must not lose sight of the fact that we are 
still dealing with human beinrgs - an individual 
or even a group of individuals who have grown 
with and put their life into their company •••• 
In one of our negotiations we met with the 
principal; we had our attorneys, he had his. 
We were just about to finish when the principal 
said 'No I can't do it'. No reason-he just 
could not do it. We got together with the same 
principal one year later and we acquired the 
company. We shook hands, and all of us went 
out to lunch that afternoon. Midway thvough 
the meal he excused himself and went into the 
men's room and vomited. It was a traumatic 
experience. Selling a company is not an easy 
thing for an owner to go through. 
Key Executives in Mergers 
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The management of a company is usually asked to stay on 
after the merger for two reasons: (1) to prevent loss of 
personnel, sales knowledge, technical knowledge, etc., and 
(2) the acquiring company has only a few people in the 
corporate office and no real knowledge of how to run the 
business it has just bought~ Many of the corporate staff 
are involved in looking at new possible acquisitions and are 
merely using financial controls to keep tabs on the ones 
already in the fold. 
Several conglomerates have emphasized that what they 
are buying is talent and not a factory machine. But this 
_talent is often lost because the management of the acquired 
company refuses to be relegated to simply playing the roles 
designated for them. This is Parson's (24) concept of 
creating a structure and forcing people to fit it. The 
same reasons that gave them the drive to reach the top 
before the merger will not allow them to remain satisfied 
with being merely a lower part of another organization. The 
executive has reached a high position in the pyramid and 
then has had a new pyramid imposed on top of him. New 
incentives must be offered to induce him to remain. 
Schoonmaker (68) has pointed out how such items as 
size, power, bureaucracy, anonymous authority, group 
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domination, and management problems lead to anxiety on the 
part of the executive. The reactions to these anxieties 
range from excessive drinking to the common cold. Many 
solutions are suggested, but the only answer is, the corpo-
ration must recognize that the "talent" they have acquired 
is a human being, or as Schoonmaker s~id, "Enlightened 
individualism must prevail." 
The key executive has one great asset, experience with 
the acquired company and its business. 
'The belief that managerial ability is general 
and transferable appeals not only to journal-
ists, novelists, politicians, and the general 
public, but to successful managers as well,' 
Dean and Smith wrote. 'We believe the weight 
of evidence is to th,e contrary, that managerial 
ability is generally tied quite closely to the 
particular industry setting in which it develops 
and operates.' A good manager's intuitions, 
like those of a good card player, come from his 
long experience with the special rules, tech-
nology, and markets of a particular industry; 
only in extraordinary individuals-so few as to 
be practically negligible-do we find the ability 
to absorb a new game intellectually and then 
compete successfully with experienced players 
(15.,, pp. 12-1 J). 
The conglomerate can encounter difficulties if 
its top management automatically assumes that a 
skilled manager can function successfully in an 
industry far removed from his prior experience 
(14, p. 8). 
Lohmann (47, pp. 121-125) points out that the manager 
has a vantage point from which information is obtained that 
is not readily available to the other contributors in the 
organization. Part of the process of managing is the evalu-
ation of information and the method by which it is to be 
communicated to the other contributors. Experience in 
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evaluation of information peculiar to the company and an 
understanding of the individuals in the company are 
necessary•: 
In the second study for this thesis, the executives in 
acquisition-oriented companies were asked to respond to two 
statements concerning key executives in acquired companies. 
The first statement was: Executives in small companies are 
more difficult to motivate after a merger than those from 
larger companies. A set of five stepped responses ranging 
from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) were pro-
vided. The responses indicate that the surveyed executives 
feel that small company executives are difficult to 
motivate. 
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The second statement was: The key executives remaining 
after a merger _is an important factor in the acquisition of 
small companies. There was again a set of five stepped 
.responses ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly dis-
agree ( 1).. The responses to this statement indicate the 
key executives are needed. 
Unwanted Executives 
Many articles recommend removing the acquired compa:-
nies' key executives at once since they are often the 
entrepreneurs and will not fit into the companies' organiza-
tional structures. The executives that are innovative find 
that the formal structure that has been imposed on them 
stifles their freedom of action. 
Many acquired presidents discover - if they did 
not know it before - that they are not 'organization 
men' but basically entrepreneurs. They would rather 
plant a garden than tend it, and no corporate 
structure is flexible enough to retain such men. 
The reason is put candidly by Morris R. Jeppson, 
forty-seven, who has merged two companies he 
founded with High Voltage and with Armour & Co., 
and left them both. 'Our commitment,' he says 'is 
not to a company but to technology. And my key 
people come right along with me, from company to 
company.' For this kind of foot-loose entrepre-
neur, a merger is merely a phase in a continuing 
cycle of innovation (J, p. 156). 
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Forest D.· Wallace of McKinsey and Comp.any and R. H. Malott 
of FMC corporation pointed out the differences between the 
organization man and the entrepreneur at a conference at the 
University of Chicago in 1963. 
Malott 
In these Southern California companies that 
have been purchased in order to acquire the 
services of the bright entrepreneurs who 
founded them, don't you find that the talents 
of these men sometimes are not the talents 
required for success in the merged company? 
Wallace 
Yes, I think there is a good deal of that. 
I ca~ think of one classic case of a real 
entrepreneur who built a cqmpany from nothing 
to $JOO-million sales but.who was incapable 
of managing it when it got big. But he 
wouldn 9 t let anyone else manage it. If he 
had l'eft the firm about ten years ago, it 
could really have taken off. Admittedly, 
the stock went up about a thousand per cent, 
but I think it would have done even better 
if the president, who wasn't a big share-
holder, had let others manage it. 
Malott 
Isn't there a type of entrepreneurial skill 
which is often not compatible with the quali-
ties required for managing a division of a 
large corporation? The kind of talent that 
has made a man successful in initiating and 
developing a small company in many cases, it 
seems to me, ,is not the' kind of talent that 
,makes him a successful part of. a large 
corporation. 
Wallace 
Bicks 
This is very often true. One of the problems 
in buying such a company is figuring out how 
to get the man out of the mainstream. It 1 s 
often better for the acquiring company to buy 
him of'f', in terms of' early retirement, than 
to try to f'ind a place f'or him. 
You f'eel that eve:n though he is very dif'f'er-
ent, he can't make a contribution? 
Wallace 
The entrepreneurial type is dif'f'e·rent. In 
f'act, he is usually the opposite of' what we 
know today as the ideal organization man 
( 2, p. 180) • 
Machiavillian Approach 
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One of' the basic assumptions of this thesis is that the 
key executive in an acquired company is desired and needed; 
however, there are many times when such an executive must be 
removed. Although their loss is serious, to let them remain 
or slowly be eased out will create even more serious problems •. 
I;n an article on cost reduction, C. M. MacMillan took the 
Machiavillian approach to the elimination of key executives. 
Such advice applies to mergers as well. 
Take time to plan well, but when you are ready 
move fast. The sooner its over, the sooner the 
conjecture and uneasiness will cease •••• Whoever 
acts otherwise either through timidity or bad 
counsels is always obliged to s-tand knife in hand 
and can never depend on his subjects• •••• Men 
who are kept while their peers are being let go 
easily conclude that they are superior beings. 
Now is the time to feed the ego. Forget the I 
and by word and action make it we (49, p. 75). 
CHAPTER V 
EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES 
The four incentives examined in this thesis are (1) 
bonus, (2) stock plans, (3) salary, and (4) status. Several 
of these incentives could be broken down further, but the 
problem becomes overly complex, hence, only broad categories 
are used. 
Bonus and Contingent Payout 
Bonus 
Since the key executives of a company are in a position 
where their decisions have a direct effect on the profita-
bility and growth of a company, they are often paid a bonus, 
supposedly related to the company's performance. The theory 
being that the additional motivation will result in improved 
performance of the company. The same approach is used by 
many of the acquisition-oriented companies in motivating the 
key executives of their acquired companies. 
The bonus is difficult to apply throughout an organiza-
tion. The further down the hierarchy the individual, the 
less effect the bonus will have. In a conglomerate or other 
acquisition-oriented company, the divisions or acquired com-
panies must be well separated or defined in order that 
,. ,. 
performance measurement be possible. In an independent com-
pany, the functions must be very well separated. 
Beach ( 7, p. 682) has pointed out a weakness in profit 
sharing that also applies to the acquisition-oriented com-
pan~es' use of bonuses. 
A fundamental weakness of profit sharing is 
that employees' earnings are tied to profits-
something over which they have only modest control. 
Profits are affected by general business conditions 
and the state of the business cycle, extent of com-
petition, luck, caliber of top management, and 
other factors beyond the control of the employees. 
Of course, employees as a group do have some effect 
upon profits to be sure. But if top management 
wishes to adopt such a program primarily for its 
incentive aspect, then this objective can only par-
tially be realized. 
Although Beach (7) is primarily concerned with blue 
collar workers, acquired company executives can have the 
same problems. 
He felt the tightening,grip of the organiza-
tion in other ways. Teledyne proposed taking over 
Microwave's insurance program. It bought a $2-
million building that Microwave had been leasing 
and put it in Microwave's capital account. This 
depressed the return on '~Per~, the parent company's 
investment, which was Teldyne's ultimate measure 
of performance. It hurt Kaisel personally since 
incentive bonuses were pegged to return on PCI 
(J, p. 153). 
The bonus is popular as an incentive since it can 
theoretically be reduced when the company has poor years; 
thus, the company can protect itself. However, bonus plans 
fall far short of providing real motivation. A growing num-
ber of companies have been searching for ways to discard or 
replace bonus practices that appear to be burdensome from 
the standpoint of cost and valueless as motivators. Many of 
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these companies have found that the payouts are welcomed, 
but that participation in them bears no relationship to per-
formance results. While executive bonus plans are typically 
greeted with enthusiasm, interest soon tapers off. One dif-
ficulty lies in the tendency to take rewards for granted 
after a brief period of operation. 
The bonus has status connotations in addition to its 
monetary reward. Many executives do not wish to specify the 
level at which one becomes eligible; in fact, there appears 
to be no rule except that they are for the upper echelon. 
The mere membership in the club is an important incentive. 
The smaller companies with few executives rarely pay 
major bonuses for several reasons. First, the company is 
an extension of the executive in the truest sense of the 
word. To empty the coffers at the end of the year is un-
acceptable. This feeling diminishes as the number of 
stockholders increase. Second, ordinary bonuses are taxed 
as ordinary income, but if the company is built up and then 
at some point in time it is sold, the gain is taxed at the 
lower capital gains rate. At some point, the bonus based 
on company profits loses power to motivate executives as 
they perceive that they can no longer affect the profits 
and, hence, have no influence on their bonus. 
In the acquired company, it is expected of the execu-
tive to desire a bonus just as the acquirer wants to reduce 
risk and increase motivation. "Membership in the club" and 
the faith in own performance provide motivation in the 
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acquired company. The problem of taking funds from one's 
own creation is no longer in existence since it is no longer 
his. The real possible growth in the company by plowing 
back funds is controlled by the profit plan. Although his 
bonus is based on division profits, in reality they are 
determined by the corporate office and are an expression of 
faith and reward for short term performance. 
The bonus must be. large enough to be meaningful. Pro-
fessional consultants recommend that at least twenty per 
cent of the incentive package must be bonus if it is to have 
any real incentive effect. A poor year in which the bonus 
should be lowered or not paid at all can actually be a nega-
tive incentive. 
A bonus plan based on company profits is a powerful 
incentive only if there is provision for recognition of 
individual contributions to over-all corporate success as 
well; that is, a bonus system which penalizes the outstand-
ing performers because of over-all poor company performance 
is demotivating. 
Lohmann (47, p. 86) points out: 
One skill of managers in a large complex of unit 
organizations lies in their ability to inculcate 
in the contributors the necessary connection be-
tween the immediate resultant of the formal unit 
organization and the eventual satisfaction of 
their personal purposes. 
The bonus suffers this problem as an incentive, since it is 
paid for past performance. The executive tends not to think 
of his personal gain except at the end of the year at bonus 
time. Nytronics Incorporated pays their bonuses out in 
twelve equal payments in an attempt to overcome this 
problem. 
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The deferred bonuses can be grouped into two categories: 
(1) short-term deferrals, and (2) long-term deferrals. 
Short-term deferrals involve paying part of the award at the 
time it is declared with the remainder paid over the next 
few years. Long-term deferrals involve the postponement of 
the entire award until retirement or other termination. The 
award is then paid in a series of annual payments. Taxes 
make the deferred bonus more and more popular. Additionally, 
the use of deferred bonuses can force executives to stay in 
order to receive the rewards. The short-term deferral is of 
use in highly cyclical industries to help even-out the flow 
of income. 
Contingent Payout 
The contingent payout is also known as the incentive 
payment arrangement or the earnout. The acquiring company 
makes a down payment of cash, stock, etc., and also makes an 
agreement that additional consideration will be paid if the 
acquired company meets or exceeds agreed on performance 
standards for a specified number of years after the acquisi-
tion. Since the contingent payment is a form of bonus and a 
means of continuing status incentives, it deserves mention. 
When the acquisition-oriented company executives were 
asked in one of the surveys for this thesis whether or not 
they used contingent payouts, over two-thirds indicated they 
did. The technique has both positive and negative aspects. 
The main advantages to the acquiring company are obvious: 
reduced risk and increased motivation for the acquired 
company's executives. 
A separation of the acquired company from the parent 
company is required if its performance is to be accurately 
measured. The parent can avoid paying for performance it 
actually generated in the acquired company and also avoid 
blame if something goes wrong. The separation prevents the 
acquiring company from making any changes, providing assist-
ance, and generating any synergy. Integration is delayed 
and combination or restructuring of the over-all company is 
made more difficult. 
Not all of the risk are to the acquirers; the selling 
company agreed to the use of the contingent payout in the 
hope of getting more for the company than in an outright 
sale. If the company does not meet its goals, then the 
former owners lose out. Mergers always cause some unrest 
and the loss of any middle management or other problems may 
affect both profits and sales. In addition, there is the 
strain of being under the gun, having to keep on proving 
one's self when the management may be tired and want out. 
Thomas Riggs (64), Vice President of Textron, pointed out 
that if a contingent payout is involved with more than one 
ex-owner participating 9 loss of payments due to failure to 
meet goals can cause internal friction. 
The advantages to the selling company are that it can 
receive a larger payment than through a straight sale. 
Autonomy and independence are assured unless the. seller 
fails to meet the profit plan. In most cases, there is a 
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bailout clause to protect the parent company. The control 
may not be as great as the seller thinks. The independence, 
or feeling of it, can be an incentive of great importance if 
the owner-managers wish to continue in business. Harold 
Marko (51)~ President of SOS Consolidated~ pointed out that 
far from being a method of acquisition allowing autonomy .the 
contingent payout is a method of tight incentive control. 
The control of incentives controls the entire acquired com-
pany. He further feels that most small firms desire for-
mality and this tight control. 
Many factors which are not easily determined at the 
time of the sale~ such as goodwill 9 future profits, etc. 1 
may be covered by contingent ~ayouts. The problem of agree-
ing on price is overcome to a large extent. The acquired 
company actually pays for itself through its stream of 
earning so 
The acquired company must be watched so that running on 
a reduced staff or other short-term techniques are not used 
to hold up profits in the short term. Such watching implies 
controls which are what is hopefully being avoided by the 
use of this technique. 
The motivation and the risk reduction seem to outweigh 
the problems involved. In the era of rapid decisions, it 
allows some latitude for error in determining the companiesv 
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real picture. The technique has been recommended for use 
with small businesses and closely held companies where the 
real value is difficult to determine. 
Stobk arid Stocik Option~ 
The ownership of stock in a company is often felt to be 
a powerful incentive for its executives. The independent 
owner-manager usually receives stock in the acquiring com-
pany in trade for his company's stock. Such a transaction 
avoids tying up the parent company's cash, motivates the 
acquired executive and avoids certain tax problems. Addi-
tional stock options allow the parent company further moti .... 
vational incentives for use with the acquired company's 
executives. The desire to make a great deal of money by 
building the company up either after receiving stock or a 
stock option is often played on by the parent company as are 
stock purchase plans. The stock of the parent company is 
often used as a substitute for the stock in the acquired 
company to attempt to continue pride-of-ownership. Pride of 
ownership is discussed. later in this chapter. 
A stock option represents a c,ompany' s offer to sell a 
specific riumber of shares of its stock to a given individual 
or group of individuals at a specific price. It gives the 
individuals the opportunity to purchase the stock during a 
stated time period, In simple terms, if the value of the 
stock increases during the option period, it will be to the 
individual's advantage to exercise the opJion. If the price 
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declines during the option period, the option need not be 
exercised. The stock option program tends to emphasize 
long-term corporate success; whereas, most bonus plans tend 
to emphasize short-term success. Wettling (56, p. 127) 
points out that: 
••• stock option plans afford corporate manage-
ment the opportunity to compensate executives and 
other employees in a completely discriminatory 
manner. Unlike stock-purchase plans, which 
require broad coverage of employees, stock-option 
programs enable management to pick and choose 
participants and, within broad limits, arbitrarily 
determine the number of option shares to be granted 
to each one. 
The power of the stock option as an incentive was 
drastically reduced by the tax reform acts of 1964 and 1969. 
The 1964 tax act raised the holding period for capital gains 
treatment of the increase in value of the stock to three 
years and reduced the option life to five years. To a large 
extent, the effect of the 1964 changes were concealed by 
rising stock prices during the 1960s. Patton (58, p. 21) 
states: 
This helps to explain the generally myopic view 
of stock options prevailing long after its 
passage. 
Senior executives, who had profited hand-
somely from their earlier optionsj felt it only 
fair, when old plans expired, to offer the new 
Hqualified" options to oncoming younger execu-
tives. The latter, in turn 9 accepted the options 
in good faith because of the earlier profitabil-
ity to their seniors. 
The slump of 1969 occurred just when the five-year option 
period of the early qualified plans was expiring. Patton 
estimates that one-half of all of the executives who had 
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exercised options in the late 1960s were forced to sell by 
declining prices for self-protection. The 1969 tax reform 
bill deals in an indirect manner with the effect of stock 
options as an incentive. Only the first $50,000 of gains 
now is eligible for the twenty-five per cent alternative 
income tax, limiting the maximum effect that this incentive 
can have. Also, there is now the provision that one element 
in an executivevs compensation package must be evaluated in 
terms of its impact on another element in his total pay. 
The 1969 tax act's impact on stock option gains now requires 
an assessment of provisions involving the maximum tax, the 
minimum taxj and the alternative tax on capital gains. The 
net result is to further confuse the value of the stock 
option incentive. Not only is it mentally discounted as a 
future incentive~ but its value in the future is clouded. 
The establishment of a fifty per cent maximum individ-
ual tax rate in 1972 gives a large boost to the short-term 
incentives and further erodes the value of the long-term 
incentive. The spendable income yielded by this change will 
downgrade all types of deferred income in importance. One 
of the major advantages the stock option has for the indi-
vidual is to receive at least some of his income at a lower 
tax rate than ordinary income would receive. In fact, sev-
eral executives in the study stressed this advantage above 
all others. 
The incentive programs in the future probably will not 
use the stock option to as great an extent as it has been 
used in the past because of the 1964 and 1969 changes in the 
tax laws. The uncertainty of future congressional actions 
and the stock market also will tend to move incentive pack-
ages in the direction of the short-term incentives. Of 
course, the young executive still may feel that there is 
glory in stock options and there is a certain amount of 
status in being included in such a plan. 
In the small organization or one with very few owners, 
the owner manager has no problem in identifying his position 
in the hierarchy. The stock option fills this need in the 
acquired organization since only certain key employees are 
eligible. Stock options not only are a motivational incen-
tive from the point of possible monetary gain, but also a 
status incentive. Several executives bragged about options 
they had received from the corporate office, even though the 
stock was now selling below the option price. In companies 
where ownership and management have separated,the key execu-
tive can still find his position in the hierarchy and the 
status of the option is not needed. Only when a new hier-
archy is imposed from above does the need for additional 
status come into play and a stock option is one method by 
which this can be achieved. 
The stock option is not available and, therefore, not 
of any real interest to the company executives in a company 
having only one or two owners. Either one owns stock or one 
does not. However, as the number of owners increases 1 such 
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options become possible and interest in them rises. The 
owner manager identifies with his company and wants to be 
more a part of it. At some point, ownership and management 
start to separate and the interest starts to wane. The 
manager no longer identifies with the organization to the 
extent the closely held organization owner does; it is no 
longer his child. 
In acquired organizations, the executive of a company 
is expected to show his interest in stock options regardless 
of how much money or stock he may have obtained as a result 
of the merger. In factj some conglomerates keep track of 
which executives have exercised stock options or purchased 
stock through purchase plans so that their loyalty may be 
measured. Such interest in stock options would be expected 
to be relatively uniform over wide ranges of corporate size. 
Salary as a Basic Incentive 
Base salary for many years has been losing its impor-
tance as a part of the executive's incentive package because 
of the tax and motivational advantages of other items. How-
ever, with shifting tax laws, salary again is gaining in 
importance as advantages of the other items diminish. Even 
the uncertainty of future taxes.on the long-term portions of 
the package puts more emphasis on the certainty of salary 
and its immediate payment and taxation. The bonus and stock 
options are being questioned more and more as to the actual 
motivational value that they have. The recent recession has 
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emphasized the variability of some of the i terns in the incen-
tive package which were more or less assumed to be fixed. 
The strong desire to motivate executives through the 
use of stock options, contingent payouts, bonuses, etc., 
often causes the power of straight income to be overlooked. 
Yet, salary is by far the most visible portion of the incen-
tive package. and is the yardstick by which the package is 
usually judged. Other than motivation, companies want to 
reduce the risk to themselves by use of incentive plans tied 
to some measure of company or division performance. 
The salary can be basically divided into two segments, 
one portion provides for the bare necessities and the re-
mainder for ego satisfying needs. Maslow (52, pp. 80-106) 
developed a theory of human motivation which assumes that 
needs are arranged along a hierarchy of priority or potency. 
When the needs that have the greatest potency and priority 
are satisfied, another step up the ladder of motives occurs. 
The hierarchical order from most potent to least potent is 
physiological needs, safety needsj needs of love, esteem 
needs, needs for self-actualization, cognitive needs, and 
aesthetic needs. A rough breakdown of these needs would put 
the first two in the bare necessity portion of the salary 
and the remainder in the acquired need or ego satisfying 
portion of it. The acquiring company management also tends 
to break salary down this way and to emphasize its use to 
relieve the first two wants and to overlook its use to sat-
isfy ego needs. Lohmann (47, p® 249) points out: 
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In most industrial organizations, the major por-
tion of all incentives offered are ego satisfying. 
Only a small portion of the material incentives or 
a minor portion of the wage or salary is required, 
in most cases, to maintain health and life. Thus, 
wages, which have received so much attention, must 
be considered and stud~ed from the standpoint of 
how they allow one to differentiate himself from 
those considered inferior and to equate himself 
with those considered equal or superior. Money is 
not a strong incentive for most industrial em-
ployees as a means to live, but it is strong as a 
means to attain a desired status and standard of 
living. 
Salary is usually far and away the largest portion of 
the executive's income. Since it is of such magnitude, it 
is tempting for those companies wishing to tie total com-
pensation to company performance to reduce salaries after a 
merger. The theory being that bonus, stock options, etc., 
will offset the loss; however, the executive sees his salary 
every two to four weeks and in only rare cases does he see 
the bonus or stock option more than once a year. Incentives 
should never be reduced or swapped in this manner. 
The acquiring company must be flexible in its desire to 
provide motivational incentives such as stock options, 
bonus, etc. The salary is of extreme importance and should 
receive consideration 7 especially in those situations where 
there are very few stockholders or that they have only a few 
years left until retirement. 
What really serves to motivate a president? 
This is an intriguing question. In one operating 
company, the president, a self-made millionaire, 
was recently given a 12% salary boost. Soon 
afterwards his top aide remarked, 'The boss is 
pleased as punch. You should hear him crowing 
about that raise.' 
·· Is the money the motivation'? We doubt it. 
We believe, rather, that the president lives in a 
lone1:y world. He is expected to be continuously 
.cognizant of his duty to appreciate the good work 
of his people, but personal recognition for him-
self is not easy to come by. Money often means 
little to the millionaire--far more important to 
him is the fact that the parent company thought 
enough about the job he was doing to give him a 
raise (42, p. 98). 
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Of course, some executives desire the chance.to "hit it big" 
and want incentives which do not carry the heavy tax burden. 
The fact that young executives are still interested in 
incentives other than salary alone was noted by Patton (58, 
p. 26) in his study of stock options as an incentive. 
Not all executives, however, have become disillu-
sioned with stock options. The younger executive, 
particularly one who has not had an option, still 
finds them attractive. But his interest primarily 
reflects his lack of e:xlPerience with the knowledge 
of the changes which have resulted from the 1964 
and 1969 tax laws. 
The idea of the young entrepreneur and his small com-
pany comes to mind; however, the empirical research indi-
cates that the average'e:x:ecutive had been with his company 
for a considerable length of time. Also, that the companies 
surveyed had been in existence considerably longer than 
expected. Lewellen (44, pp. 215-219) indicates that in 1963 
the average age of the top executives in the sample he 
studied was 60, where in 1940 it was 56. 
The few (approx'imately 12) respondents that were sur-
veyed ind ag~s c6ecked were found to range from 50 to 58. 
There appeared to be no correlation with the age of the 
executive and his desire for long-range versus short-range 
incentives. It should be pointed out that executives in 
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very small companies already control most of the stock and 
are not as interested in stock as an incentive. Additional-
ly, bonuses are not paid and the money plowed back into the 
company for additional growth. At the upper end, the 
more organization~oriented individual may be more sophisti-
cated in motivational techniques and are less interested in 
the problems of bonuses and stock-options, but still not 
true organization men. 
Since executives in small companies with few stock-
holders are not interested in many of the other incentives 
available, it is only natural that salary should be their 
main desire. As the number of stockholders rise, the inter-
est in the various incentives such as status, stock, and 
bonus rise until the break-over when such interest starts 
to decline as discussed in other sections of the thesis. 
These changing desires for other incentives shap~"the 
salary model in the opposite direction based on percentages. 
The uniform desire for the various incentives in the 
acquired company executive group also keeps their desire for 
salary relatively uniform. The desired income in salary for 
this group is approximately seventy-five per cent; whereas, 
the executives in acquiring companies showed an average 
desire of approximately sixty-five per cent to be paid to 
acquired executives. The desired salary incentive of 
seventy-five per cent is close to that desired by the group 
of independent company executives in the 20 to 200 owner 
company range. Above and below this group, salary is of 
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greater concern. Since this group's desired mix is close to 
that desired by executives after a merger, little change or 
selling of an incentive package needs to be done. However, 
the desired salary incentive never drops to as low a percent.:. 
age as the acquiring companies' desire to pay, so over 
emphasis qn the other incentives must be avoided if the key 
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executive is not to initiate search behavior. 
Status and Pride of Ownership 
Status 
In discussing status and the problems involved in merg-
ers by change of status, the definition of status by Barnard 
(6, p. 208) shall be used • 
••• that condition of the individual that is 
defined by a statment of his rights, privileges, 
immunities~ duties, and obligations in the organ-
ization and, obversely, by a statement of the 
restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions gov-
erning his behavior, both determining the expec-
tations of others in reference thereto. Status 
becomes systematic in an organization when 
appropriate recognition of assigned status 
becomes the duty and the practice of all par-
ticipating, and when the conditions of the status 
of all individuals are published by means of dif-
ferentiating designations, titles, ap.pellations, 
insignia~ or overt patterns of behavior. 
There are two kinds of status, functional and scalar; 
however, only scalar is of interest when dealing with indus-
trial executives. Scalar status is determined by jurisdic-
tion and by the relationship of superiority in the hiearchy 
of the organization. 
Although Barnard (6, p. 211) breaks the apparatus by 
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which status is established and maintained into five cate-
gories, only two are of major interest in discussing the use 
of status in the corporation. The two are "emoluments and 
prerequisite of position and office" and "titles and appel-
lations of office and calling". The other three are 
"insignia and other public indicia of status", "ceremonies 
of induction and appointment'', and''limitations and restric-
tions of calling and office". 
Titles often are only a description of the function 
performed; however, because of other conditions such as dif-
ferences in salary, bonus plans, etc., the title also 
becomes a designation of status. In the organization with 
few owners, such identification is not of as great impor-
tance as it is in larger ones; everyone knows who the owners 
are. 
Quite oftenj the title is changed as a result of merger; 
the president becomes general manager, the vice-president 
becomes plant manager. The justification for such title 
changes is usually based on rationality. The organization 
would appear top-heavy and inefficient to potential inves-
tors if there were too many executive titles. 
This same reduction of status and for the same reasons 
occurs in the second category. Barnard (6, p. 212) states 
that: 
Emoluments~ prerequisites, and privileges are 
highly important evidences of status and are often 
highly valued. Care should be taken, however, to 
distinguish between the valuation of them as mate-
rial rewards and as evidences and elements of 
status. They are almost universally employed in 
organizations of all kinds. In business and in 
some other organizations they are even more 
important than titles in fixing status. The use 
or nonuse of restricted quarters, automobiles, 
chauffeurs, private offices, private secretaries, 
and other prerequisites in various combinations, 
time clocks, etc., provide a complex code that 
describes the system of status in effect, 
thoroughly understood by the initiated and fairly 
easily sensed by the outside observer. 
One reason companies change the status of acquired execu-
tives is the desire for power on the part of the acquiring 
company's executives. The company that is acquisition· 
oriented quite often is the creation of one executive or a 
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small group of executives. The executives in the acquiring 
company can gain relative status by reducing that of the 
executives in the acquired companies. 
The manager-founders of an acquisition minded company 
are motivated by growth or they would not have started the 
company in the first place. The desire for something larger 
to control or a desire for greater power is a strong motiva-
tion and provides the esteem and self-actualization for 
them; i.e.~ additional size equals additional status. How-
ever, additional quantities of a given item does not always 
guarantee additional status, the relationship is subjective 
and not linear. 
The management of an acquired company cannot readily 
accept their new roles fo~ althoµgh they have received com-
pensation in the form of stock or money, they have lost 
self-esteem and the rewards of self-accomplishment or self-
actualization. Most conglomerates change the titles of the 
management. Other symbols of their authority and position 
are removed such as company cars and elaborate offices. 
This loss of titles and authority lowers the esteem of 
others in addition to a feeling that the executives were 
losers or could not be successful on their own; in other 
words, a loss of self-esteem. The rewards of self-
accomplishment are removed since the firm is no longer 
theirs to guide and they can no longer identify their con-
tributions as having any significance to the over-all 
organization. 
Teledyne's growth diminished the importance of 
Microwave. From 10 percent, it dropped to 
supplying about 1 perc,ent of Teledyne's revenues, 
and no matter what Kaisel did, it could have no 
significant. impact on Teledyne stock, which put 
a further crimp in his incentive (3, p. 164). 
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As indicat~d, the loss of status is a s~rious loss and 
the acquiring firm must maintain it for those in the 
acquired company even at the expense of some profits. 
Actually, the loss of efficiency of such key employees and 
possibly their quitting may result in even larger drops in 
profit than the savings made by discontinuing the incen-
tives. The executives' prestige must be maintained and it 
is even more important where small companies are involved. 
Apparently, the executive will not feedback his dissatis-
faction if his company is small for two reasons. First, he 
cannot admit the need because of his own self-made image, 
and second, he is probably awed at the size disparity be-
tween his company and the acquiring one and feels 'might 
must make right'. 
A broker told me recently that the best way to 
strew the acquisition path with rocks and ruts is 
to diminish the prestige of the acquired company's 
top management •••• When one company is absorbed 
by another, I do not think that the importance of 
maintaining individual status and prestige can be 
overplayed. In my experience it is easier to 
knock $20,000 off the purchase price of a company 
than it is to get a man to give up his car (66, 
p. 132). 
The separation of "pride of ownership" from "status" is 
not clear cut as both involve loss of control or erosion of 
authority. It should be pointed out that removal of status 
is one way companies have of getting rid of executives with-
out really firing them. 
Although nominally retained as president, Dimick 
found himself in a cubbyhole office with no 
secretary and scarcely any entree to Varian's 
president. A chemist and introvert, Dimick had 
never had the stomach for the 'people problems' 
of management and somehow had convinced himself 
that a merger would free him of running contro-
versies with his general manager and other prob-
lems. Instead, Varian put the more able general 
manager in charge of Wilkens and hoped Dimick 
would leave: (3, p. 164). 
This approach to removing an executive can cause problems 
for both the executive and the company. 
Loss of status is more than loss of its 
emoluments; it is more than loss of prestige. It 
is a serious injury to the personality. Thus, 
while improvement of status is important, especially 
to the more able, and desirable to many, loss of 
status is much more generally resisted. It is dif-
ficult to accept, or to be accepted in, a reduced 
status. Indeed, the fear of losing status is what 
leads some to refuse advancement of status. The 
desire for improvement of status and especially the 
desire to protect status appear to be the basis of 
the sense of general responsibility (6, pp. 229-230). 
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Pride-of-Ownership 
Dr. Harry Levinson has stated "for the founder, the 
business is an instrument, an extension of himself. He has 
great difficulty giving up his instrument, his source of 
power" (50, p. 8). 
The building of a company gives the owners and managers 
a feeling of self-accomplishment known as pride-of-
ownership. The fifth of Maslow's (52) hierarchy of needs is 
self-actualization. The loss of self-actualization also 
results in a shift in the feelings of self-esteem. It is of 
worth to note that the people having this feeling do not 
have to actually be owners to be deeply committed to the com-
panies' success.: The fact that ownership and the feeling of it 
do not necessarily go together helps justify the approach 
many acquisition-minded companies use in providing challenge 
alone as an incentive and hoping that even though ownership 
is lost, the executive will continue to identify with the 
divisions' accomplishments. However, the acquired company 
must be kept separate and distinct in order to accomplish 
this. The acquiring company is at cross purposes, the 
attempt to integrate and make "one big happy family" and let 
the top management take credit is the opposite of the small, 
hard working, successful groups where the individual manage-
ments get credit and the feeling of independence continues. 
Worthy (81, p. 173) and others have shown that small groups 
have higher morale than larger ones. The desire to tie all 
of the acquisitions together through common names, house 
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newspapers, etc., indicates the desire to diminish individ-
ual group feelings. 
The conglomerate-wide house organ, published to 
build employee interest in the parent company 
and its products, was rarely read by the local 
employees or their families. Its contents were 
too far removed from the local interests of the 
local employees, and its writing was a flaccid 
artificiality. As a result, few employees had 
any interest in the company as a whole, or its 
welfare (37, p. 36). 
Such loss of group identification allows easier unionization 
of multi-divisional companies. 
A lo·ss of int ere st on the part of the lower level 
employees often reflects the acquired company's executives' 
attitudes. Managements of acquiring companies often deny 
that the loss of pride-of-ownership occurs. Ownership of 
stock in the parent company has been a common approach to 
solving the problem. The following selections from an ad-
vertisement placed in the Wall Street Journal by a conglom-
erate indicates the use of pride in the parent company and 
ownership of its stock as a substitute for the pride-of-
ownership in the original company. 
How can anyone possibly not know about a 
company as big as xyz? Maybe it's because we've 
been too busy building the company to spend much 
time blowing our own horn. 
Int. That sounds like a hint. One last 
question. Are you a millionaire? 
Mr. Jones: Well ••• even when I was a kid 
I wanted to be one. And J haven't been disappointed. 
But I'm a lot prouder of other things. Like start-
ing with nothing and building a company that made 
jobs for several hundred people. That's worth more 
to me than a big bank account •••• Like with stock, 
for instance. Practically my entire net worth is 
in xyz stock. That's a pretty good incentive to 
keep xyz growing (78, p. 18). 
Other incentive approaches such as bonuses, contingent 
payouts, and others have been used as a substitute to keep 
the key executive working.for growth. The attempt to sub-
stitute the satisfaction of one need with another is risky 
at best as Lohmann (47) has pointed out. Incentives are 
viewed subjectively and the view of the participant is dif-
ferent than that of the manager or controller of the 
incentives. 
Some of the acquisition-oriented executive respondents 
felt that good management should be able to get over the 
feeling of loss. "The loss of pride-of-ownership or being-
my-own-boss may have such a strong impact that the executive 
collapses in his capacity to perform. Generally, these were 
always weaker managers." 
Research 
During the first study for this thesis, executives were 
asked to record what their attitude would be if their com-
pany was acquired by merger. The question was then asked 
"Would ownership of stock in the acquiring company affect 
your outlook in the questions above?" Two-thirds responded 
ityes". The executives having "yes" answers were primarily 
· top management and those replying "no" were of middle 
management. 
Although stock in the acquiring company is a help in 
cutting down dissatisfaction it is not a substitute that can 
overcome the loss of pride-of-ownership. Feelings are 
involved that are hard to overcome. Loh~ann (47, p. 133) 
points out: 
Because messages about non-material incen-
tives or about one's "feelings" have seemingly 
more information loss due to the difference of 
pe~sonal referents of the words, it is usually 
necessary for managers to communicate more about 
them than about material incentives. The source 
of the incentives, their relationship to the 
activities contributed, and their evaluation in 
subjective terms are not easily or quickly 
explained. 
Managers select contributors who will evalu-
ate highly the benefits that the resultant will 
provide and who will minimize the burdens the 
activity will impose. The manager also by per-
suasive communication attempts to alter the 
value of the incentives to the contributor, thus 
inducing cooperation. 
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Only by understanding the acquired executives' feelings 
and by continuing to work with them and change the values 
can pride-of-ownership become a pleasant memory and not a 
mental block. 
CHAPTER VI 
METHODS OF OBTAINING AND REDUCING 
EMPIRICAL DATA 
Ideally, the best approach to obtaining information on 
any changes in the desires of executives for a certain in-
centive would be to measure their desires before and after a 
merger. Unfortunately, this is impossible as the study 
would cover several years. A base line before the executive 
knew of the merger would need to be established and then the 
desires measured again well after the merger took place. 
Additionally, it is impossible to know in advance just where 
a merger will take place. 
The measurement of incentive desires of independent 
company executives is complicated by the lack of knowledge 
as to the number of stockholders in a given small company. 
The simplest approach to solving this problem also solves 
the problem of measuring change of incentive desires before 
and after merger. By taking a random sample of small com-
panies that appeared to be independent, a sampling of execu-
tives in companies that had a varying number of stockholders 
was obtained as well as a sampling of company executives 
whose companies had been acquired. Since no questions were 
asked directly concerning mergers 1 the acquired executives 
C.n 
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responded with little fear that their feelings about incen-
tive changes and dissatisfaction would be exposed. 
The first attempts to obtain information on executive 
attitude toward mergers and incentives were from the head-
quarters of various conglomerates. Permission was requested 
to interview or send questionnaires to the key executives in 
companies they had acquired. In all cases, either no reply 
was received or excuses were given as to why they could not 
participate in the study. At the same time, one of these 
companies was running half-page advertisements in the Wall 
Street Journal showing how happy the executives in their 
acquired companies were. From the layout and the media 
used, it is obvious they were not trying to contact the 
general public, or investors, but were trying to sell the 
idea of merging with their company to other independent 
company executives. The following is a portion of that 
advertisement: 
Int. 
How did you feel about selling and turning 
your company over to someone else? 
Mr. Smith: 
You should ask my wife that; she knows what 
I went through. It was traumatic. Suddenly 
the company isn't yours anymore. You don't 
really know what will happen to you. You 
wait for the man from XYZ to come and change 
things and tell you how to run the company. 
Int. 
What happened? 
Mr. Smith: 
XYZ has a system that works beautifully. 
That's where it's different. The weeks 
went by. Months went by. I waited for 
someone from XYZ to start giving orders. 
It never happened. Suddenly you realize 
that they were telling the truth. They 
really do want you to keep running your 
company. To a man like me, that's impor-
tant. I kept my independence and my 
self-respect. 
Int. 
Why does XYZ insist that the head of an 
acquired company stay on to run it? 
Mr. Smith: 
That's the only way. We aren 1 t talking 
about gigantic companies that have 
professional management. WeVre talking 
about the entrepreneur who built a highly 
successful small company. XYZ makes you 
want to stay with the company (78, p. 18). 
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It is apparent that things must not be quite as rosy as 
the corporate office would like you to believe. An acquir,..... 
ing firm, in fact, does not want the public to receive any 
hint of internal dissent. Memos are often sent to the 
divisions instructing them as to what questionnaires to fill 
out, as well as requesting that the senders of such requests 
for data be identified for action by the corporate office. 
Two alternatives suggested themselves as ways around 
these roadblocks: First, get subjective opionions of those 
who are involved with the organization, but not under its 
regulation, i.e., those that buy from the organization or 
sell to it. Second, measure differences in opinion as to 
the desire for various incentives available to key execu-
tives, i.e., between the key executives in small companies 
of various sizes and those in companies that have been 
acquired. There are both strong and weak points in either 
approach; hencej both were tried. 
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Purchasing and Sales Survey 
An initial attempt to study changes in an organization 
as a result of merger was undertaken during the month of 
August, 1970. The study .consisted of a survey of outsiders' 
views of various types of mergers. Sales and purchasing 
personnel were asked to. complete a two-page questionnaire 
concerning companies that they had had contact with which 
had gone through one of three kinds of mergers. 
Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory, 1970 
edition, was used to obtain names and addresses of indi-
viduals in companies which appeared to be in a position of 
either selling to or supplying manufacturing firms with 
goods or services. Approximately 200 firms were selected 
for contact and sent questionnaires. The geographical area 
of the United States that the company was located was not 
considered to be a factor in the way in which the questions 
would be answered. Because of the distribution of manufac-
turing firms, more questionnaires were sent to the East and 
to California than other areas. In the companies selected, 
only one questionnaire was sent to a specific individual. 
The original thrust was a comparison of three kinds of 
mergers in their effect on the personnel and performance of 
an acquired company. The three kinds of mergers investi-
gated were: (1) the conglomerate that acquired a company 
and left the original management in charge, (2) the conglom-
erate that acquired a company and changed the management, 
and (3) the company that purchased a firm and dissolved it 
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into an already existing division. The use of three differ-
ent kinds of mergers greatly complicated the questionnaire. 
Since the questions were of a highly subjective nature, 
the backgrounds of the persons filling out the question-
naires were also studied for possible correlation with their 
opinions of mergers. A sample questionnaire is in Appendix 
A. 
The results were highly subjective and indicate only 
general trends. The respondents indicated that acquisitions 
in which the key executives were removed or the company dis-
solved were not desirable from the standpoint of satisfac-
tion, efficiency, or competitive ability. The results of 
this initial study are used to support points brought out by 
the second study. 
Comparison Study 
A two-part survey was undertaken in April of 1971. The 
first part involved only key executives in companies employ-
ing from 50-2,500 people. The second part involved those 
executives in companies which had been involved in acquir-
ing other companies and who were perceived to have some 
control over the incentives given to the key personnel in 
acquired companies. 
The main objective of this study was (1) to look at 
variation in desire for different components in the incen-
tive package of key executives as the number of stockholders 
varied and ( 2) to examine the·· possibility of alienation of 
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acquired company executives by changes in their desires for 
certain incentives after a merger. 
The importance of various elements in executive incen-
tive packages were studied for three groups: small inde--
pendent company executives, small acquired company 
executives, and those controlling incentive packages of 
acquired company executives. The relative sizes of various 
items in the incentive package as desired by the three 
groups were also examined. 
The number of owners was picked as a measure of company 
size for this work because of wide variations in sales, 
profits, or number of employees a company may have during a 
business cycle. The size of iricentive package components 
was measured in percentage of total package in order to get 
around the reluctance of executives to deal in absolute 
numbers and to get around company and industry variations. 
A sample questionnaire is in Appendix A. 
The Dun and Bradstree Million Dollar Directory, 1971 
edition (55) was used to obtain names and addresses of key 
executives in 170 companies. The survey was limited to 
manufacturing concerns having approximately 50-2500 
employees. 
The magazine, Mergers and Acq1,1.isitions (53) was used to 
identify those companies that had been the acquiring company 
in at least one merger from 1968 through 1970. The Dun and 
Bradstreet Directory was then used to identify the individ-
ual in the acquiring company that appeared to have the best 
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perception of what incentives are normally used in their 
acquisitions. Usually, a vice president in charge of 
acquisitions or treasurer was selected. Fifty-one companies 
were used in this second part of the study. Because of the 
poor response to the first study, simplified single-page 
questionnaires were used in both halves of the second study. 
The response was much better than in the first study with 
nearly 40% of the questionnaires being returned in both 
parts of the study, however, many were only partially 
completed. 
A third survey was undertaken in December of 1971 to 
obtain additional information on the independent and 
acquired company executive. Approximately 40 replies were 
received, but only about one-half of these were complete. 
Method of Testing and Reducing 
Data 
The data for independent companies shows a sharp break 
in incentive desire in the 10-50 owner region. Although 
other approaches to fitting the data are possible, linear 
regression (least squares) appears to be the most appro-
priate for each side of the break. The data for acquired 
companies also seemed to lend itself to linear regression. 
The data in all three groups was broken into ten cells per 
group and regression performed by use of the "A" regression 
program. This program additionally provides a "t" value for 
testing the hypothesis that the regression coefficient is 
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other than zero. An 11 F 11 test of the residual sum of squares 
allows the lack of fit to be evaluated for each of the 
regression models. 
The data presented is a combinetion of both the April 
and December surveys. Additionally, the April data is 
tested against the December data in Chapter VII to allow 
proof of the techniques' predictive ability. 
CHAPTER VII 
MODELS OF INCENTIVES 
Stock and Stock Options 
Stock as an incentive is little desired by executives 
in companies with very few stockholders. There is little 
reason to desire more stock since the executive holds a sub-
stantial portion of it, and has achieved a high level of 
self-actualization or pride-of-ownership. The data indi-
cates that in companies with only three or four stock-
holders the interest in stock as an incentive is nearly 
zero. However, the desire for stock as part of the 
executive's incentive package mix rises to 13 per cent of 
their total desired incentive package in companies with 17 
to 18 owners. In compani~s with more than 20 stockholders, 
the regression coefficient changes significantly, indicating 
ownership and management are beginning to separate.; the 
regression line models have been created for the data either 
side of this breakover poirtt. Executives in companies with 
30 to 1~9 owners indicate a lower desire for stock as an 
incentive of about four per cent. The interest in stock 
eventually reaches zero for exesutives in companies with 
more than 800 stockholders. 
The executives in acquired companies exhibit a desire 
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for the stock incentive to be at a level of about six per 
cent of their total incentive package. This level does not 
change with variation in the number of stockholders in the 
parent company. Acquiring companies would prefer to have 
executives in their acquired companies take about 17 per 
cent of their income in stock, indicating a need for aware-
ness on the part of the acquiring companies management as to 
the differences in desire (see Appendix B): 
Models of Stock as a Desired Incentive 
Independent Companies. 1-20 stockholders (see 
Figure 3a) 
Regression coefficient= 1.7~61 
Intercept= 2.0200 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" vaJue 17° of 
freedom= 2.8936 
Lack of fit "F" value= .1751 
0 5 of freedom numerator 
13° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .95 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.95 
Independent Companies. 30-1000 stockholders (see 
Figure 3b) 
Regression coefficient= -.2791 
Intercept= 2~9383 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression 11 t 11 value 20° of 
freedom= -.7089 
Lack of fit 11 F 11 value= .8863 
6° of freedom numerator 
15° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .50 (model not consistent with hypothesi~ 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.60 (model fails because of lack of fit) 
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Acquired Companies. (See Figure Jc) 
Regression coefficient= .2388 
Intercept= 4.3833 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 17° of 
freedom= .5244 
Lack of fit "F" value= 1.7251 
0 7 of freedom numerator 
11° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other than 
·o < .50 
Confidence regression line fits means of cells 
>.50 (model fails because of lack of fit) 
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The models created through the use of linear regression 
have regression coefficients which support the hypothesis. 
However, the lack of fit to the data is significant in the 
models for independent companies with J0-1000 stockholders 
and the model for acquired companies~ Additionally, the 
data for independent companies with J0-1000 stockholders 
does not allow a high confidence that the regression coeffi-
cient for the model is other than O. The model for inde-
pendent companies with 1-20 stockholders is accepted. 
Salary 
The desire for salary as an incentive is predominant; 
however, there are wide variations in the percentage of 
income desired as salary by executives in independent com-
panies. For executives in companies with only three or 
four stockholders, the interest in salary as an incentive 
approaches 90 per cent of their desired incentive packages. 
The desire drops to approximately 60 per cent on the part 
of executives in companies having 17-18 stockholders. This 
decline of interest in salary as an incentive is reversed in 
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companies with JO or more stockholders and rises eventually 
to 100 per cent. 
The executives in acquired companies exhibit a very 
slight change in desire for the salary incentive as a part 
of their incentive package as the number of parent company 
stockholders vary. The acquired company executives desire 
that salary make up approximately 75 per cent of their 
incentive packages; however, acquiring companies indicate a 
desire to pay only 65 per cent as salary to acquired 
executives (see Appendix B): 
Models of Salary as a Desired Incentive 
Independent Companies. With 1-20 stockholders (see 
Figure 4a) 
Regression coefficient= -4.J021 
Intercept= 97.6441 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 17° of 
freedom= -4.2207 
Lack of fit 11 F 11 value= .0001 
5° of freedom numerator 
13° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .95 
Confidence regression line fits the means of 
cells> .95 
Independent Companies. With J0-1000 stockholders 
(see Figure 4b) 
Regression coefficient= 3.9705 
Intercept= 65.4286 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 20° of 
freedom= 4.6599 
Lack of fit "F" value= .1718 
6° of freedom numerator 
15° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .95 
Confidence regression line fits the means of 
cells> .95 
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Figure 4. Regression Models of Per Cent of Income 
Desired as Salary With .95 Confidence 
Intervals and Means of Cells 
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Acquired Companies. (See Figure 4c) 
Regression coefficient= -.17533 
Intercept= 77.2249 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 17° of 
freedom= -.3489 
Lack of fit "F" value= .1230 
0 7 of freedom numerator 
11° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O < .50 
Confidence regression line fits the means of 
cells> .95 
The models created through the use of linear regression 
have regression coefficients that support the hypothesis for 
both the independent companies and the acquired companies. 
The lack of fit is not significant in any of the models, 
therefore, all are accepted. 
Bonuses 
The data indicate executives in companies with few 
stockholders have a greater interest in bonus as an incen-
tive rather than stock. Executives in the three to four 
owner company group desire to have bonuses make up about 
seven per cent of their incentive mix. The desire for the 
bonus incentive increases to a level of 15 per cent of the 
executive's incentive mix in the 17-18 stockholder company; 
however 1 the interest then declines as the stockholder pool 
increases in size. The regression model for the J0-1000 
stockholder side of the breakover point approaches O desire 
for the bonus incentive in the 800 stockholder region. 
Executives in acquired companies should have a rela-
tively uniform interest in the bonus as a portion of their 
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incentive package regardless of the size of the stockholder 
group. The data does indicate some decline in the execu-
tive's desire for a bonus as size of the stockholder group 
increases. The desire for the bonus incentive by acquired 
executives starts at 12 per cent for those executives in 
parent companies with few stockholders and declines to 10 
per cent for those in companies with over 1000 stockholders. 
The managements of acquiring companies indicated they desire 
to pay acquired company executives about 12 per cent of 
their income as bonuses (see Appendix B). 
Models of Bonus as a Desired Incentive 
Independent Companies. 1-20 stockholders (see 
Figure 5a) 
Intercept= 5.42830 
Regression coefficient= 1.7342 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression 11 t 11 value 17° of 
freedom= 1.80764 
Lack of fit 11 F 11 value= .3782 
0 5 of freedom numerator 
13° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > . 90 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.85 
Independent Companies. 30-1000 stockholders (see 
Figure 5b) 
Regression coefficient= 3.2252 
Intercept= 28.3152 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression 11 t 11 value 20° of 
freedom= -J.9802 
Lack of fit "F" value= .2213 
6° of freedom numerator 
15° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .95 
Confidence regression line fits means of cells 
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Figure 5. Regression Models of Per Cent of Income 
Desired as Bonus With .95 Confidence 
Intervals and Means of Cells 
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Acquired Companies. (See Figure 5c) 
Regression coefficient= -.7368 
Intercept= 15.6167 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 17° of 
freedom= -1.2238 
Lack of fit "F" = .4823 
7° of freedom numerator 
11° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other than 
0 > .85 (model not consistent with hypothesis) 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.85 
The three models all fit the data adequately for the 
86 
type of study undertaken. The significance of regression of 
all three models also is adequate, hence, all models are 
accepted. 
Status 
The data for the small independent company executives 
(1-20 stockholders) indicate that the desire for status in-
centives as part of their incentive packages is small in 
the companies with only J-4 owners. However, the interest 
in status rises as the number of owners increases reaching a 
level of 12 per cent of desired income for executives in 
companies with 17-18 stockholders. The data for the J0-1000 
stockholder independent company executives indicate very 
little interest by the executive in companies with over 800 
stockholders. The reversal of sign for the regression 
coefficients of the 1-20 stockholders and J0-1000 stock-
holders models indicate a breakover point where personal 
involvement begins to decrease. 
The acquired company executive was expected to have a 
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desire for status that is relatively uniform with differ-
ences in size of the stockholder pool of the parent company; 
however, the data indicate a variation in level of the 
desire for the status incentive from four per cent in the 
1-1200 stockholder group to 19 per cent in the 10,000-12,000 
stockholder group. 
Models of Salary as a Desired Incentive 
Independent Companies. 1-20 stockholders (see 
Figure 6a) 
Regression coefficient= 1.4086 
Intercept= -.9190 
Evaluation of the adequacy of linear regression 
model: 
0 Significance of regression "t" value 17 of 
freedom= 3.2811 
Lack of fit "F" value= .1078 
5° of freedom numerator 
13° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > • 95 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.95 
Independent Companies. 30-1000 stockholders (see 
Figure 6b) 
Regression coefficient= -.4662 
Intercept= 3.3204 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression 
Significance of regression "t" value 20° 
of freedom= -1.0971 
Lack of fit "F" value= .0666 
6° of freedom numerator 
15° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .85 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.95 
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Figure 6. Regression Models of Per Cent of Income 
Desired as Status With .95 Confidence 
Intervals and Means of Cells 
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Acquired Companies. (See Figure 6c) 
Regression coefficient= .8567 
Intercept= 2.3700 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 17° of 
freedom= 2.6263 · 
Lack of fit 11 F 11 value= .7115 
6° of freedom numerator 
11° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > • 95 (model not consistent with hypothesis) 
Confidence regression line passes through 
means of cells >.75 (model fails because of lack 
of fit) 
The models created through the use of linear regression 
for independent companies have regression coefficients which 
support the hypothesis and adequately fit the data. The 
model for acquired companies has a slope other than zero and 
does not fit the data well, hence, it cannot be accepted. 
Stock and Bonus 
The data for desired stock and bonus incentives was 
combined into an additional series of models in which the 
level of incentive was tied,in some measure, to over-all 
company performance. Combining the two also combines desire 
for long and short term incentive desires and removes some 
of the scattering caused by other variations. 
The data indicate that the executive in a company with 
J-4 stockholders desires that 10 per cent of his incentive 
I 
I 
package be made up of bonus and stock incentives. In the 
17-18 stockholder group of companies, the executive desires 
that nearly JO per cent of his income be in some form of 
these two incentives, however, the interest then declines 
• 
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reaching zero interest for executives in the 800 stockholder 
company region. 
Acquired company executives have a uniform desire for 
stock and bonus incentives, which is about 20 per cent of 
their total incentive package. It is of interest to note 
that acquiring company managements feel that JO per cent of 
the total incentive package for acquired executives should 
be made up of these two incentives (see Appendix B). 
Models of Stock and Bonus as a 
Desired Incentive 
Independent Companies. 1-20 stockholders (see 
Figure 7a) 
Regression coefficient= 2.6860 
Intercept= 4.9472 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 17° of 
freedom= 2.7558 
Lack of fit 11 F 11 value= .0844 
5° of freedom numerator 
13° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .95 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.95 
Independent Companies. J0-1000 stockholders (see 
Figure 7b) 
Regression coefficient= -J.5043 
Intercept= 31.2508 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression "t" value 20° of 
freedom= -J.8780 
Lack of fit "F" value= .1624 
6° of freedom numerator 
13° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > .95 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.95 
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Figure 7. Regression Models of Per Cent of Income 
Desired as Bonus and Stock With .95 
Confidence Intervals and Means of Cells 
Acquired Companies. (See Figure 7c) 
Regression coefficient= -.5000 
Intercept= 20.0000 
92 
Evaluation of adequacy of linear regression model: 
Significance of regression 11 t 11 value 17° 
of freedom= 1.0470 
Lack of fit 11 F 11 value = 1. 82 
0 7 of freedom numerator 
11° of freedom denominator 
Confidence regression coefficient is other 
than O > • 70 
Confidence regression line fits means of 
cells >.80 
The models created through the use of linear regression 
adequately fit the data with the exception of the acquired 
company model. Since there were no sections of the hypoth-
esis relating to the combined incentives of bonus and stock, 
the models' primary purpose is to back up the individual 
models for these two incentives. 
Reliability of Data 
The data from the April and December studies have been 
combined to form a series of composite models for use in 
determining the level.of desire for the various incentives. 
The reliability of the data was examined by using the data 
from the April survey to create a series of models as a 
standard against which the December data was tested. A 
regression line with .95 confidence limits was calculat~d 
for each of the models using the April .data. The December 
data was then superimposed on the April models. If the 
April confidence intervals contain the December regression 
lines, the hypothesis that the two sets of data came from 
the same universe cannot be rejected. 
10, 1.1, and 12) • 
(See Figures 8, 9, 
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The status and salary models indicated a high degree of 
reliability, but the bonus and stock models did not. A 
composite model of bonus and stock combined was created to 
check the change in desire for incentives tied to company 
performance, the model also worked well. The recent changes 
in economic conditions apparently affected the executives' 
views of stock and bonus as incentives. The models show 
that the desire for status, salary, and incentives based on 
performance to be consistent between the two studies. But, 
the mix of performance-based incentive~ such as stock and 
bonus, also varied with other influences. Such influences 
as price controls, market conditions, etc., should be taken 
into account when preparing the models. 
Example 1 
An acquisition oriented company with 5000 stockholders 
is interested in purchasing a small manufacturing company 
that has only four stockholders. The acquiring company 
intends to run this new subsidiary as a separate division 
retaining its key executives. The acquiring company would 
like to know what incentive mix will be needed to keep the 
executives and the additional costs: the models assist in 
answering these questions. 
The "c" series of models shows what the acquired 
company's executives desired incentive-mix will be after 
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Figure 11. Relationships Between Regression 
Models of Per Cent of Income Desired 
as Status for December Data and April 
Data With .95 Confidence Intervals 
for the April Data 
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the merger occurs and time has allowed stabilization of the 
new relationships. 
Salary 77% from Figure 4c for 5000 stockholders 
Bonus 11% from Figure 5c for 5000 stockholders 
Stock 6% from Figure Jc for 5000 stockholders 
Status 7% from Figure 6c for 5000 stockholders. 
The executives in the independent company currently 
have a different desired mix of incentives as shown in the 
II all models. 
Salary 88% from Figure 4a for four stockholders 
Bonus 8% from Figure 5a for four stockholders 
Stock 2% from Figure Ja for four stockholders 
Status 2% from Figure 6a for four stockholders. 
Obviously, the desired mix of incentives must change. 
Salary will decrease in importance and the desire for other 
incentives will be increased. Simply adjusting salary to a 
new level will not be adequate; other incentives will 
eventually have to be adjusted to the desired post-merger 
mix. Since the salary incentive should not be reduced, the 
extra cost of increasing the other incentives must be con-
sidered in deciding the acceptability of keeping the key 
executives. 
If a key executive currently has a salary of $25,000 
(88% of his desired incentive mix), his desired incentive 
package is: 
100 
Salary 88% = $25,000 
Bonus 8% = 2,270 
Stock 2% = 570 
Status 2% = 570 $28,410 
In an acquired organization, the executive's salary of 
$25,000 is 77% of his desired incentive mix. Hence, his 
desired mix is: 
Salary 77% = $25,000 
Bonus 11% = 3,600 
Stock 6% = 1,950 
Status 7% 22280 
$32,830 
The executive's desire for the bonus incentive will be 
increased by $1,330; his desire for the status incentive 
will be increased by $1,710, and his desire for the stock 
incentive by $1,380. The bonus and stock must be made 
available as the executive's desire changes. The status 
incentive must also be increased by adding additional com-
ponents, not removing existing ones, and by helping the 
executive to revalue his desires for status incentives. 
Approximately $4,400 of additional incentives are needed 
along with empathy for the executive's changing role. 
Example 2 
An acquisition-oriented company is undecided as to 
which company to pick in a choice between the acquisition 
of a company with four stockholders and another with 250 
stockholders. The models may be used to determine which 
company's executives would best fit the desired incentive 
mix after merger and, therefore, require less selling and 
less risk of loss. 
Four stockholder company 
Salary 88% from Figure 4a for four stockholders 
Bonus 
Stock 
Status 
8% 
2% 
2% 
from Figure 5a for four stockholders 
from Figure Ja for four stockholders 
from Figure 6a for four stockholders 
250 Stockholder company 
Salary 76% from Figure 4b for 250 stockholders 
Bonus 
Stock 
Status 
17% 
3% 
4% 
Acquired company 
from Figure 5b for 250 stockholders 
from Figure Jb for 250 stockholders 
from Figure 6b for 250 stockholders 
Salary 77% from Figure 4c for 5000 stockholders 
Bonus 11% from Figure 5c for 5000 stockholders 
Stock 6% from Figure Jc for 5000 stockholders 
Status 7% from Figure 6c for 5000 stockholders 
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As can be seen, the executives in the company with 250 
stockholders have desired incentive mixes which more closely 
match the mix that has been found acceptable to executives 
which have been involved in mergers. The executives will, 
therefore, adapt mor~ readily to the new incentive mix with 
less effort on the part of the acquiring company. The 250 
stockholder company should be picked rather than the four 
stockholder company. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY 
Problem and Hypothesis 
The purpose of this thesis has been to develop a 
series of models relating the desired incentive packages of 
independent manufacturing company executives to the number 
of company stockholders. The same desired incentive package 
components are also modeled for acquired company executives. 
By using the two groups of models, the changes in attitude 
on the part of company executives going through a merger 
can be anticipated and the minimizing of the friction 
resulting from changes in desired incentives can be aided. 
The executives in an independent company have desired incen-
tive mixes based on personal involvement with the organiza-
tion and their places at the top of the hiearchy in addition 
to other drives for various incentives. Apparently, the 
executive is not always able to verbalize these incentive 
desires during a merger because of the unfamiliarity of the 
merger ritual, the overshadowing of the new hierarchy, the 
reasons behind his desire to sell the company, and the 
trauma of selling 11 his" company. The desired incentive mix 
of acquired company executives is different than that of the 
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independent company executive and varies little with the 
size of the group of owners. The acquired company execu-
tive 1 s incentive mix is based on what he perceives the 
parent company desired to give, what he thinks he should 
have, and what has been found necessary to identify his 
position in the hierarchy of the organization. Although 
literature gives some indication of the problem of keeping 
key executives after a merger, there is little written on 
the need to change incentive mix of the acquired company 
executives. The use of. stock options and bonuses after a 
merger is usually suggested only as a method of tying 
division performance to executive pay. 
! 
The hypothesized models cover four major incentives: 
salary, bonus, stocks, and status, and the changes in 
desire as the number of owners vary and as the ownership 
varies. It was hypothesized that: 
(1) Status is of little interest to executives 
in independent companies having few stock-
holders and also to those executives in 
companies having larger numbers of stock-
holders. However, there is a middle group 
to which status does assume importance; 
therefore, a convex upward curve of desired 
status results. Acquired company executives 
have a desire for status that is independent 
from the number of stockholders. 
(2) Bonuses follow the same general pattern as 
status; that is, the independent company 
executives in companies having few stock-
holders and those having many stockholders 
have little desire for the bonus incentive. 
The middle group has a greater desire for 
the bonus incentive than the two extremes 
again giving a convex upward curve of 
incentive desire. The acquired company 
executives have a desire for bonuses that 
is independent of the number of stockholders. 
(3) Stock options follow the same pattern as 
bonus and status for both independent 
company executives and acquired company 
executives. 
(4) Salary, being the remaining incentive, has a 
downward convex curve. The salary incentive 
is of greatest importance to the executives 
in the companies having few stockholders and 
those having many stockholders. The salary 
incentive is not as important to the middle 
group as it is to the extremes. The acquired 
company executive has a rather uniform 
expectation that varies little with the number 
of stockholders. 
Conclusions 
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Linear regression has been used to create models from 
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the data used in this thesis. In most cases, the linear 
model has provided an adequate fit of the data. Although 
there is a large amount of pure error, the significance of 
the regressions and the fits of the data to the means of 
the cells shows the hypothesized trends to be valid. Test-
ing of April versus December data showed that the major seg-
ments of the models were stable over time and, therefore, 
are of predictive value as well as verifying the validity 
of the data. 
By identifying the size of the acquired and acquiring 
organization in terms of the numbers of stockholders in 
each, the presently desired incentive package before a 
merger for an executive may be determined and his desired 
package after a merger may also be determined. Such infor-
mation allows the acquiring company to determine what it 
will take to keep such an executive in the organization. 
The total incentive package will eventually approach the 
acquired executive models; therefore, selling of the new mix 
in the early stages of the merger anticipated. The total 
cost of an executive's package may be anticipated as incen-
tives must be added to and not substituted. Such additional 
costs may cause the acquiring company to take a second look 
at the proposed merger. The executive in an independent 
company controls his incentive mix closely to his desired 
mix. Only 28 per cent wanted to change their incentive mix, 
but 50 per cent of the acquired executives wished to change 
theirs. 
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Limitations of This Study 
The amount of pure error needs to be reduced by being 
more selective in picking compani~s and studying them in 
depth. Although looking primarily at the effect of a vary-
ing number of peers, other factors should be considered or 
eliminated. No proof is presented that the age of an execu-
tive is a factor in his desired incentive mix. A few 
executives' ages were determined with a range from 52 years 
to 58 years, inclusive. There is some evidence that this 
trend will be changing in the future toward an older execu-
tive, and, therefore, special attention should be given to 
this area. The few acquired companies which were examined 
for "time since the merger took place" indicate a wide 
variation, but also a minimum time of three years which 
indicated the executives contacted had been in the new 
hierarchy long enough for their desires to stabilize. The 
executive's company is a factor, in that different types of 
manufacturing tend to have different compensation plans, 
tighter control of selection of companies for the models 
should be made. 
Recommendations for Additional Study 
The greatest problems occurred in getting the respond-
ents to evaluate their true feelings. And then, getting 
them to reveal these feelings. When the situation involves 
change of incentives, executives seem to inherently become 
defensive. Any attempts to obtain data on alienation and 
motivational techniques from an acquiring company is 
impossible. 
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Initially, face-to-face interviews produce the broadest 
and most comprehensive viewpoints. These can later be 
broken down for statistical evaluation. But not until com-
panies and executives understand and communicate their indi-
vidual goals can progress be made in developing successful 
merger techniques with satisfied executives remaining in the 
company. 
Response was good with a reasonable return of all 
questionnaires. Personal interviews should be the founda-
tion for further statistical work. Actual companies need 
to be identified and case studies made. However, the pri-
mary difficulty is the reluctance of executives to discuss 
their own and their company's policies and goals, particu-
larly if they should differ. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
11 /_,_ 
August 3, 1970 
Dear Sir: 
A survey is being conducted on the effect of management change 
on company efficiency. Since it is difficult to obtain infor-
mation from those directly affected, views of persons on the 
outside of such changes can be very useful. 
The study is concerned with three tyves of merger conditions. 
CA) Acquisition by a conglomerate (a company that has acquired 
. many diverse businesses, .such as LTV, Litton, Gulf and Western, 
and Textron) with the acquired company's original management 
team remaining intact. 
(B) Acquiaiti~n by a conglomerate with the management team 
changed either by its own desires or by pressure from the con• 
glomerate. 
(C) Acquisition by a multidivisional company (diversified but 
with major growth being internal, such as TI, Collins, and GM) 
with the acquired company absorbed into one of the already 
existing divisions. 
We realize these divisions are not always clear cut. Only yoOl 
general impressions are needed so do not feel you must verify 
answers. Also do not identify yourself or your company. 
Please fill out the applicable portion of each question if yd« 
know a company that fits one of the catagories. Your help ill 
needed and greately appreciated, Please return the completed 
questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope. 
H. l.. Mitchell 
~esearch Engineer 
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Please check tbe appropriate boxes for each question 1f you are familiar with a firm which 
·haa gone through that particular type of merger, 
1 General aatisfaction·of the people you contact in a firm acquired by: 
(a) a conglomerate that did not change the management, 
(b) a conglomerate that did change the· ·man·agemeht, 
(c) a multidivisiona.l firm that disolved the company. 
2 ·the effectiveness after the merger of those you contact as compared to their effeC'.tive-
ness before ~he>merger in a firm acquired by: 
(a) a conglomerate that did not change the management. 
(b) a conglomerate that did change the· management. 
(c) a multidivisional firm that disolved the company. I I I I I I 
3 Competitive ability and efficiency of the acquired firm or its reminants as compared 
to itself.before the~merger in a firm absorbed by: 
(a) a conglomerate that did not change the management, 
(b) a conglomerate that did change the management. 
(c) a multidivisional firm that disolved the company. 
4 Ability of the absorbed firm or its reminants to get cooperation and 
guidance from the parent company since it was taken over by: 
(a) a conglomerate that did not change the management. 
(b) .a conglomerate that did change the management. 
(c) a multidivisional firm that disolved the company, 
5 Ability of the absorbed firm or its reminants to obtain good employees 
or in keeping them since it was taken over by: 
6 
7 
(a) a conglomerate that did not change the management. 
(b) a conglomerate that did change the management. 
(c) a multidivisional firm that disolved the company. 
Length of time since the acquisition of the firm by: 
(a) a conglomerate that did not change the· management. 
(b) a conglomerate that did change the management. 
(c) a multidivisional firm that disolved the company. 
Number of employees in the acquired firm at the time of acquisition by: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
a conglomerate that did not change the management. 
a conglomerate that did change the management. 
a multidivisional fi.rm that disolved the company. 
I I I I I I 
I I I. I I I 
11 11 I I 
8 The management level of the persons you contact within the firm acquired by: 
9 
(a} 
(b) 
(c) 
a conglomerate that did not change the management. 
a conglomerate that did change the management. 
a multidivisional firm that disolved the company. 
In a company acquired by a conglomerate and whose management changed, how long after 
the acquisition did the change occur? 
under 6 mo. D 6 mo. - 1 year D 1 - 2 years D 2 - 5 years D over 5 years D 
Please go on to page 2. 
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10 In a firm that has been disolved how long after the conglomerate or the multidivisional 
took over did the disolution occur? 
under 6 mo. D 6 mo, - 1 year D 1 -· 2 years D 2 - 5 years Dover 5 years D 
The following information about your opinions, your job and your company would be appreciated, 
Please check the appropriate boxes, 
11 What is the number of employees in your company or division? 
0-100 D 100-soo D soo-1000 D 1000-2500 D 2500-up D 
12 What is your position? 
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V President D VP Sales D Sales Manager D Chief of purchasing D Purchasing Agent D 
Other D 
13 What is the title of your ill1lllediate superior? 
President D _V President D Chief of Purchasing D VP Sales D Sales Manager D 
Other D 
14 What is your company type? 
Single Organization D Multidivisional D Conglomerate D 
15 Have you ever worked for a company when it was absorbed or about to be absorbed by 
another company? 
Yes D NoO 
16 How would the absorption of your company by a conglomerate affect your efficiency if 
the original management of your company were retained? 
Greatly improved D Some improvement D No change D Slightly hurt D Greatly hurt D 
17 Would the absorption by a ·congl~merate of your company affect your job satisfaction if 
the original management were retained? 
Greatly improved D Some improvement D No change_ D Slightly hurt D Greatly hurt D 
18 How would your efficiency be affected if your company was absorbed by a conglomerate 
and a new management team brought in? 
Greatly improved D Some improvement D No change D Slightly hurt D Greatly hurt~ 
19 How would your job satisfaction be affected if your company was absorbed by a conglomerate 
and a new management team brought in? 
Greatly improved D Some improvement D No change O Slightly hurt D Greatly hurt D 
20 Would ownersh1.p of stock in the acquiring company affect your outlook 1.n quest1.ona 
number 16, 17, 18 and 19? 
Yes D No D Do not know D 
21 Any remarks you may wish to make on the subject in general. 
Thank you for your time and your help. Please return both pages of. the questionnaire in 
the self-addressed envelope. 
HEU 
Oklahoma State University 
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 
Apr I 1 16, 1971 
I 
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STILLW,'.TER, OKLAHOMA 14014 
ENCi/NEERINCi NORTH, ROOM 322 . 
(405) 372-6211, EXT, 7561 . 
A survey of executives' views on various incentives is 
being conducted as part of a study on the relationship 
between company size and compensation techniques. This 
survey i s 1 i mi te.d in size; hence, maxi mum response Is 
needed. We would .deeply appreciate It if you would take 
a few moments to fill out the enclosed questionnaire. 
All information is confidential and neither your name 
nor your company's name is des I red. Even if you do not 
wish to fill out the entire questionnaire, please return 
It in the enclosed envelope. 
Sincerely yours, 
Herbert L. Mitchell 
1. A bonu• plan based on company profits is a powerful incentive. 
Stronaly agt"lle [ ) Agree [ I No opinion [ J Disagree [ J Strongly di•agree { 
2. A stock option plan is a powerful incentive. 
Strongly agree [ J Agree [ J No opinion [ Disagree [ Strongly disagree [ 
3. Status incentives (office location~ company car, title) provide strong motivation for 
executive• and affect their status in the community. 
Strongly agree [ I Agree [ J No Opinion [ I Disagree [ Strongly diaagree r 
4, Pride-of-ownership is a powerful incentive for owner-manager, of I company., . 
Strongly agree [ I Agree [ ) No opinion [ ) Disagree ( ) Strongly diaagree [ 
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S, Afte1: a merger the ownership· of stock in the parent company providH aufficient feeling 
of "pride of ownership" for the acquired company's executives. 
Strongly agree [ I Agree [ J No c;>pinion [ J Disagree [ J Strongly disagree 
6. After a merger, bonus plans or contingent payout plans may be sufficient to off set 
any change of status incentives (company car, title, etc.), 
Strongly agree [ J Agree [ I No opinion [ J Disagree [ Strongly disagree [ ·1 
7. Please indicate .the percentage of "income" that each of these incentives contribute 
to your overall compensation package. Stock_, Salary--• ,onus_, Status 
8. If the present percentages shown in number seven ere not to your liking please indicate 
the percentage mix you would prefer: · Stock _, Salary _, _Bonus _, Status 
9. After a merger, continuation of the acquired company aa a separa.te organization with 
some of its stock held by its key employees is a better way to continue their motiva-
tion than ownership of stock only in the acquiring company. 
Strongly agree [ ) Agree [ J No opinion [ ) Disagree [ Strongly disagree [ 
10. If you agree with question nine what percentage of the stock should remain in the 
employees hands to make them feel that the company is still theirs. ------
11. What is your corporate or company position? 
12, Do you own stock in the company? Yes [ No [ 
13. Number of shareholders in your company?------
14. Number of employees in your company? 
15, Have you or your company ever been involved in a merger? Yes No [ 
16. Length of time in present company? 
17. Length of time company has been in business? 
THANK YOU - PLEASE FOID AND RETURN IN ENCLOSED ENVELOPE. 
n•u 
Oklahoma· State· University 
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 
Apr 11 23, 1971 
I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 711tf/',f ENGINEERING NOR1H, RODIU 322 (405) 372-6211, EXT. '1JM. 
A survey of compensation techniques is being conducted as 
· part of a stupy on the change of executive attitudes as a 
result of corporate merger. Since your firm has faced 
this s ltuat I on, your thoughts and Ideas wou 1 d be of great 
¥alue to our sttidy. · 
We wl sh to know what ·types of Incentives and compensat Ions 
WQrk, and also those that do· not work and may cause prob-
lems. Although a form questionnaire is enclosed, we feel 
your "off the cuff11 comments would ·be of great Importance. 
All information is confidential and·nelther your name nor 
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your company's name is desired, A.return envelope is en-
closed for your convenien~e. If you do not wish to convnent, 
please return the completed form. Only a few companies are 
being contacted so any help you can give would be appreciated. 
Sincerely yours, 
Herbert L. Mitchell 
.1, A bonu• .plan bHed on comp1ny profiu la • powerful lncentlve for exe.cutlvea. 
Strongly 1gree ( ) Agree ( ) No oplnlon Dli1gree ( ) Strongly dh1gree 
2, A atocli optlon plan l• • powerful. lncentlve for executlvea, 
Strongly •aree [ ) Agree [ ) No opinion [ ) Dlugree ( Strongly dlaagree 
3, St1tu1 incentlvea (office loc1tlon, company c11r, tltle) provlde • atrona motlvation 
for exec1,1tlve1, 
Strongly agree ( l Aaree ( No oplnlon Diugree (. Strongly dlugree 
4, Prlde of ownerahlp 11 a powerful incentive for owner managen of. 1 company, 
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Strongly.agree [ ) Agree [ ) No opinion [ l Disagree [ ) Strongly dlugree ) 
5. After a merger, ownerahip of· stock· in the parent company providea sufficient fee Ung 
of prlde of ownership for .the .acquired company's executives, · 
Strongly agree [ ) Aaree [ ) No oplnlon [ ) Disagree [ Strongly dlugree 
6 .•. After a merger, bonus plans, contingent payouts, stock options, or stock ln parent 
companyiire sufficient to offset any change of statue lncentivea, 
Strongly agree [ ] Agree [ ] No opinion [ ] . Diugree ( ] Strongly diaagree 
7, What _percentage· of, income aho.uld .. each of these incentives contribute to the ·overall 
compensatio.n package of an ·acquired company executive,' 
Stock_ [ ] Salary [ J _Bonus [ ] Status [ ) · 
8. After a merger, continuation of the acquired company as a separate organization wlth 
some of its stock held by its key employees'is a better way to continue thelr motiva· 
tion th~n ownership of stock, only in the acqu ir lng company. · 
Strongly agree [ ] Agte.e [ ) No opinion ( ] Disagree [ Strongly dlaagree ( 
9. If you agree with question eight, what percentage.of the. stock should ·remain in the 
employee's hands to make them feel the company is atlll. theirs. __ . ---------
10. Doe.a your company leave the incentive package for executives in an acquired company 
unchanged from the original packa~e they had before the merger. 
Yea [ ] No [ ] 
11. If your answer to question ten is no, plea·ae identify what portions of the package 
are most often changed. · 
Salary [ ) Bonus ( ] Status ( Fringe 
12. Does your company ever use contingent payouts as a form of motivating top manage-
ment in an acquired company. 
Yea [ 1 No ( I 
13. Executives ln small companies are more difficult to motivate after a merger than those 
·from larger companies, 
Strongly agree [ ) Agree ( l No opinion Dissgree [ Strongly dhagree [ 
14. The key executives remalnlng after a merger ls an important factor in the acquisition 
of small companies. 
Strongly agree ( ] Agree ( No opinion Disagree [ Strongly diaagree [ 
15, Approximate number of acquisitions in the last 5 years by your company --------
16. What is your corporate or company position? 
17. Comments 
APPENDIX B 
RAW DATA 
1• '2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 -19 ao 
A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c 
4 1 2 1 4 1 1 4 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 3 4 2 3 4 5 3 3 2 4 5 3 Chief of Pur V.P.- Cong Yes 4 3 J 4 Yes 
4 4 4 J 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 ~ 5 5 5 2 1 2 5 4 4 J 2 J 2 2 1 'Chief of Pur V.P. Multi No J J J - Unknown 
4 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 J 5 4 3 4 3 2 5 1 4 J 2_ 2 4 3 4 Unknown V.P. Multi No 4 4 2 1 No 
4 1 
-
4 1 
-
4 1 
- 3 J - 4 2 - 2 - - - 4 - - ~ - 5 - 4 Pur Agent Chief of Pur Cong Yes 4 4 J 3 Yes 
J 2 1 J 1 1 4 1 1_ 5 5 1 J J 1 2 J J 1 1 1 J J J 4 3 1 Chief of Pur Unknown Cong Yes 3 4 2 2 No 
3 2 1 J i, 2 2 4 J 2 4 3 4 4 4 2 J 4 1 2 5 3 3 2 J 4 2 V.P. Pres. Cong Yes 3 3 4 J Yes 
-
4 
- - 5 - - 5 - - 5 - - 5 - - J - - 2 - - J - - - _4 Chief of Pur V.P. Single No 4 4 5 4 No 
5 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 J 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 '.l J J 5 4 2 V.P. Pres. Single Yes 2 2 1 1 No 
2 1 
-
2 1 
-
1 1 
-
1 1 
-
2 2 - 4 4 - 2 1 - 2 2 - 5 4 4 Chie'f of Pur V.P. Single -No 2 '.l '.l 3 Yes 
4 2 1 3 2 2 J 4 2 - -
-
- - - 3 2 J J 4 4 J J 2 ,. 3 4 V.P. Sales V.P. Single No 3 2 4 4 Yes 
2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 4 2 3 J 3 3 J 3 J 4 4 2 2 2 5 4 4 V.P. Sales Press- Single No 4 4 3 2 Yes 
1 2 
-
2 2 
- 2 3 
-
2 3 - 2 3 1 2 1 - 4 2 - 2 _2 _ - 5 - 2 Chief of Pur V.P. Multi Yes 4 4 2 2 No 
2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 J J J 1 1 2 1 4 J J J 4 5 4 V.P. Sales Pres·. Multi Ni> J J J J Unknown 
J 1 - J 2 - J 2 - 3 2 - 2_ 2 - 4 3 - 5 4 - J J J 4 - 4- V.P. Pres. Multi No - J - 3 Yes 
1 
- -
2 
- -
1 
- - 3 - - 3 - - 1 - - - - - J - 2 - J Sal-es Mgr. V.P. Multi Yes 3 J 1 1 Unknown 
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J Chief of Pur Unknown Multi No 2 2 2 2 Yes 
4 
- -
4 
- -
4 - - 4 - - 4 - - 3 - - J - - J - - - - 4 -Chief of Pur Pres. Multi No 4 4 2 4 Unknown 
4 J 2 5 3 - 4 3 - 3 3 - - - 2 - - 4 - - 5 - J J 5 4 4 Chief of Pur Pi::-·es. Multi No 4 - - 5 Yes 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--- 4 Sales Mgr. Unknown Cong No 3 3 
-
... Unknown 
2 
- -
2 
- - 2 - - 2 - - 3 - - 2 - - 5 - - J - - - - 5 V.P. Pres. Cong Yes- 2 2 1 1 Yes 
-
2 
- -
2 
- -
2 
- - - - -
2 
- - 3 - - 5 - - 2 - 5 - 4 Sales Mgr. V.P. Single No 4 4 4 4 Yes 
4 
- - 3 - - 4 - - - - - 3 - - 3 - - 3 - - 2 - - - - 3 Chief of Pur Unknown Cong -No 4 3 4 4 No 
1 - - 2 - - 1 - - 2 - - 2 - - 3 - - 3 - - J - 4 5 4 Sales Mgr. Pres. Single No 5 3 4 5 Unknown 
4 
- -
4 
- - 5 - - 5 - - 3 - - 2 - - 3 - - J - J - 4 V.P. Sales Pres. Single Yes 4 3 J J Yes 
4 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 4 J Sales_ Mgr. V.P. Multi Yes 4 4 3 2 No 
J 2 - 3 - - 3 2 - 3 - - J - - 1 - - -1 ~ - 3 - - - -- 2 Sales Mgr. Pres. Multi Yes J J 2 2 Unknown 
2 
- -
2 - - 2 - - 2 - - 2 - - 2 - - 2 - - J - 5 - J Pres. - Single Yes - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - J Unknow.n Pres.- Single No 4 4 
- -
Yes 
3 1 - 3 1 - 3 2 - 3 5 - J 1 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 2 2 - 5 - 5 Sales Mgr. Unknown Multi Yes J 3 1 1 No 
4 2 
- 3 2 - 4 3 - - - - - - - 2 1 - 4 4 - 3 2 - 5 - 5 V.P. Sales Pres. Multi Yes 3 2 3 - Yes 
4 
- -
4 
- -
4 
- - 3 - - 3 - - 4 - - 4 - - J - - - - 4 V.P. Sales Pres. Single Yes 4 4 1 1 Yes 
2 
- -
2 
- -
4 
- - - - - 3 - - 2 - - 2 - - 2 - 4 - 4 Pur Agent V.P. Single Yes 2 2 1 1 Yes 
*Numbe,:s refer to question number; answers are code~ in questions 1, 2, 3·, 4, 5 as follows-: (5) much greater; (4) greater; (J) no change; (2) worse; 
(1) much worse 
answers are coded in questions 16, -17, 18, 19asfollows: (5) greatly improved_; (4) some improvement; (J) no change; 
Code for question 6 is: under 6 mo. 5 Code for questions 7, 11 is: 
(2) slightly hurt; (1) greatly hurt 
under 100 5 Code for question 8 is: top 3 
6 mo-1 year 4 100:.500 4 middle 2 
1-2 years 3 5()()..,lOO() 3 lower 1 
2-5 years 2 1000-2500 2 
Over 5 years 1 2500-up 1 
Code for questions 9,10: under 6 mo. 5 
6 mo-1 year 4 
1-2 years 3 
2-5 years 2 )-> 
over 5 years 1 [\J 
'--'-' 
Survey of Independent and Acquired Companies - April 1971 Data 
1* 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15B 16 17 
5 5 4 5 2 2 .10 .75 .10 .05 No Change 3 Pres Yes 6635 1650 Yes Unspec 13 13 
4 4 2 5 2 2 .25 .50 .20 .05 No Change 2 Pres Yes 15 95 Yes Unspec 15 15 
5 5 2 5 2 4 .10 .75 .15 .oo No Change 4 V.P. Yes 2500 · 1700 Yes .Amalgamation 4 88 
4 3 4 4 3 2 4 V.P. Yes 8 4oo No NA 20 20 
4 4 3 4 2 4 .oo 1.00 .00 .00 .10 .80 .10 .00 4 .10 V.P. No 700 Yes Unspec :-3 25 
4 2 4 4 Yes 6 700 No NA 
5 4 4 4 4 .00 .70 .20 .10 .10 .70 .10 .10 1 Exec V.P. Yes 5000 600 Yes Unspec NA JO 
4 3 5 5 2 2 .00 .90 .10 .00 .00 .80 .10 .10 4 .49 Pres Yes 5 250 No. ) NA 20 50 
5 5 4 5 3 3 .05 .75 .10 .10 No Change· 3 Chairman Yes 35 18o Yes Acquisition 25 47 
4 4 4 4 4 3 Yes No NA 20 55 
5 4 4 5 4 4 2 Corp Sec Yes No NA 4o 95 
5 5 2 4 2 3 1 Pres Yes 4oOO JOO Yes Unspec 12 12 
4 2 5 3 1 4 .oo .97 .02 .01 No Change 4 .33 V.P. Yes 850 1000 No NA 4o 112 
1 1 1 1 4 5 .10 • 75 .10 .05 No Change 5 Pres Yes 6 325 No NA 25 25 
5 5 4 4 .00 .90 .10 .00 No Change 3 Yes 4 150 No NA 20 20 
2 3 4 5 3 3 .00 .70 .10 .20 .10 .60 .10 .20 3 V.P. No 15 2000 No NA 33 62 
4 4 3 4 4 2 .05 .95 .oo .05 No Change 2 V.P. ·Yes 1250 1500 Yes Unspec 4 JO 
4 4 4 5 4 3 .00 .80 .10 .10 .oo .70 .20 .10 2 Pres Yes 14o 4oo Yes Unspec 20. 20 
4 4 V .• P. Yes JOO No NA JO JO 
5 4 3 4 2 4 .oo 1.00 .oo .oo .20 .80 .oo .oo 1 V.P. l'es 14oo 475 Yes Unspec 12 12 
3 3 5 4 2 2 .oo 1.00 .oo .oo No Change 4 .49 Pres Yes J 14o No NA 25 25 
4 2 4 5 2 3 .00 1.00 .oo .00 .00 .70 .20 .10 5 .30 V.P. Yes 12000 600 Yes Unspec 18 40 
5 4 4 4 2 2 4 .50 V.P. Yes 20 900 No NA 5 42 
5 4 4 4 3 3 .00 •• 85 .10 .15 No Change 3 Exec V.P. No 12 1o4 No NA 10 52 
4 4 4 4 2 3 .oo .80 .20 .oo No Change 3 Pres Yes 35 6Q No NA 25 40 
5 5 4 5 4 5 .oo .80 .20 .00 No Change 2 Pres Yes 400 170 Yes Unspec 20 45 
4 3 4 4 3 3 .oo .90 .10 .oo .00 .80 .20 .00 4 Pres Yes 4 250 No NA 10 25 
4 4 4 5 4 4 .10 .75 .15 .00 No Change 4 .4Q V.P. Yes 350 2500 No NA 28 4o 
4 3 j 5 2 J 3 Chairman Yes 3 200 No NA J4 34 
:!. 2 4 4 2 2 .10 .80 .oo .10 No Change 3 Pres Yes J 90 No NA 46 46 
5 3 2 5 3 4 .00 .65 .35 .00 .00 .Bo .20 .00 4 .50 ·Pres Yes 100 JOO No NA 20 50 
4 4 4 5 2 4 2 Pres Yes 250 4oo No NA J6 45 
4 1 4 2 2 3 2 Pres Yes 7 210 No NA 25 62 
J 3 4 4 3 3 .00 1.00 .oo .00 No Change 3 Exec V.P. No 6 250 No NA 12 J8 
'* 
4 3 4 3 3 .00 .90 .10 .01 • 10 .75 .15 .00 5 .15 Exec V.P • Yes 2000 200 Yes Unspec 15 18 
~ 5 4 4 3 3 .oo 1.00 .00 .oo No Change 3 Pres Yes 750 JOO No NA JO 45 
5 5 5 5 3 3 .10 .70 .10 .10 No Change 3 Corp Sec Yes 10 200 No NA 14 16 
4 2 4 5 2 4 .oo .70 .20 .10 No Change 4 .20 V.P. Yes 150 500 No NA 20 25 
4 4 4 4 4 2 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .10 .70 .20 .00 1 Pres Yes 4o 50 No NA 10 46 
4 1 5 5 3 3 3 G Mgr Yes .320 No NA 20 20 
f-" 
I\.) 
,..:-
1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9· 10 11 12 13 14 15 15~ 16 -17' 
4 4 4 5 4 4 .oo .99 .01 .oo No Change 2 Pres Yes 300 Yes- Unl;ipec - 19 24 
4 4 4 4 2 2 .oo .75 .20 .05 No Change 4 V.P. Yes 40 450 No NA 11. · ll 
2 3 4 4 3 J 3 Chairman Yes 20 200 No -NA. 20 : ._·'.2() .• 
5 4 4 4 4 4 .00 .95 .05 .oo .10 .Bo .10 .00 4- .20 Pres Yes 425 500 Yes· NA ,17. _25 · 
5 5 4 5 3 J .15 .55 .JO .00 No Change 3 V.P. Yes 40 1200 No NA · .31 - '68 
5 5 2 5 3 4 .00 1.00 .00 .00 No Change· 3 Pres Yes 670 850 ·No NA 10 26 
5 4 5 4 2 .oo • 75 .25 .00 .00 .90 .10 .oo 4 .20 Exec V.P. Yes 6 6oo Yes Unspec 27 .31 
5 4 4 3 2 3 .oo .60 .20 .20 N'o Change 3 Exec V.P. Yes 50 450 No NA .36 48 
4 3 4 5 J 3 .00 .75 .15 .10 NoCha~ge 
'* 
.49 V.P. Yes 15 450 No NA 25 55 
3 3 4 4 3 .3 Treasurer Yes 65 105 No NA 25 61 
5 5 4 5 3 3 .oo .70 .JO .00 No Change 4 .33 V.P. Yes 200 1000 No NA 16 32 
4 4 4 4 4 4 .00 • 75 .25 .oo No Change 2 V.P • Yes 850 1100 Yes .Amalgamation 24 50 
4 5 4 4 4 4 .oo .65 .18 .17 No Change 2 V.P. Yes 4000 1300 Yes Acquirer 6 25 
4 4 2 4 2 4 .oo .80 .20 .00 No Change 
'* 
.20 Exec V.P. Yes 500 2000 No NA 10 70 
5 4 2 5 4 3 .OJ .80 .17 .00 • 05 .70 .25 .oo 4 V.P • Yes 2500 Yes Unspec 29 29 
4 3 4 4 Yes 3 200 No NA 47 47 
4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Pres Yes 3000 JOO No NA 18 18 
2 2 2 
'* 
2 2 2 Pres Yes 2000 4oo Yes Unspec 2 20 
5 4 4 5 3 3 .00 .Bo .10 .10 No Change 2 V.P. Yes 3500 700 Yes Unspec 15 25 
4 4 3. 4 2 4 5 .27 Exec V.P. Yes JO 500 No NA 34 75 
3 3 4 
'* 
4 2 1 Pres Yes 3 50 No NA 20 20 
3 3 4 3 3 3 3 Pres No 270 No NA 3.3 51 
4 4 2 5 2 4 .oo .94 .05 .oi No Change 4 • .35 V.P. Yes JOO 4oo No NA 25 25 
4 J 5 5. J 2 .00 .94 .05 .01 No Change 
'* 
.51 · Yes .3 100 No NA 38 .38 
4 J 4 5 3 3 .oo .80 .70 .oo No Change 3 Yes 4oo No NA ... ~ "'~ 62 
5 5 
'* 
4 3 J .05 .70 .20 .05 :r.o Change 2 V.P. Yes 850 350 Yes Unspec 6 15 
2 2 4 5 3 2 2 V.P. Yes 1 80 No NA 21 · 21. 
5 
'* 
2 2 Pres 8 .30 Yes Unspec 50 53 
4 J 2 4 3 3 .oo .70 .JO .00 No Change 
'* 
Chairman Yes 100 700 No NA 33 33 
*The numbers refer to the question number. Questions 1, 2, J, 4, 5, 6, 9 are coded: (5) strongly agree; (4} agree; 
(J) no opinion; (2) disagree; (1) strongly disagree;% in question 7, 8 refer to stock option, slary, bon~, status in order. 
'""" [\;) 
\J1 
Survey of Independent and Acquired Companies - December 1971 Data 
1* 2 3 4. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15A 15B 16 17 
.oo .95 .03 .02 .05 .90 .03 .02 _4 .10 Pres Yes J 100 -No NA 28 65 
.oo .90 .10 .oo .No Change 2 Uns11ec No 1 3000 No NA. 36 100 
.oo 1.00 .oo .00 No Change 2 -V.P. No 1 2500 No NA 21 59 
1 Unspec Yes 6000 3000 · Yes Unspec 22 69 
.oo . 75 .25 .00 No Change J Sec Yes 225 750- No' NA 20. 60 
.oo .85 .15 .00 No Change J Exec V.P. Yes 200 '450 No NA 17 20 
.oo .50 .50 .OQ No Change 5 .15 Pres· Yes JO -2200 Yes Acquisition 50 68 
.00 • 80 .20 .oo Np Change 2 Pres Yes 5 165 No •. NA 21 21 
.oo 1.00 .00 .oo - .00 .80 .20 .oo 2 Pres Yes 70 250 -. No ~A 15 1s 
.oo _.90 .10 .oo .oo .69 .4.o .oo 4 Preis Yes 150 450 No NA 12 50 
.00 .95 .05 .00 No Change 4. v-.p. Yes 100 Yes Unspec 30 J6 
.oo • 75 .22 ~03 • 10 .70.10 .10 4 -- .• 4.o Pres No Trusts 225 No . NA -_ 40 68 
.oo .95 .00 .05 .oo .75 ~20 .05 5 -~20 Exec V.P. Yes 6000 2500 Yes Unspec · 8 75 
.oo • 75 .25 .oo .10 .65 .25- .oo 1- Exec V.P. Yes 300. 2700 No NA 26 65 
.00 .95 .05 .00 No Change 3 ·Pres No 9-_ 125 No NA 31 46 
Pres .. Yes- 350 No NA 37 37 
.00 .90 .05 .05 No Change 3 Pres Yes 4ooo 400- Yes Merger_ 16 40 
.00 • 85 .10 .05 No Change 4. .25 Prei;i Yes 8 _2:15 Yes Merger .15 25 
.00 • 75 .25 .oo No Change :3 Pres. Yes 75 1000 No NA 19 53 
• oo .90 ,oo .10 .16 • 8o • 10 .00 5 . ~20 Yes 10000 .3000 Tes · Merger 20 25 
.10 .60 .25 .05 No Change -_4•· -~25 - Cha:i.nilan ·yes 10 ~70 No NA 22. 26 
• 10 .75 .15 ~oo No Change J V-.P. Yes 5000 Yes . Upspec 27 4J 
.oo .85 .12 .OJ .00 .75 .·22- ~OJ- - 4 .• ita- kee Y.P. Yes .150 1200 Yes Unspec 16 70 
.00 .80 .20 .00 
.25 .50 ~·-~- ~05" J - Ptes•· Yes "12 '"150 No NA 15 15 
.oo .70 .20 .10 •. 20 .60 • io .10 4 Pr~ Yes 12 JO No NA 20 20 
.05 .so .10 .05 .15 .60 .15 .10 1 Exec, :Y,l'!. Yes_ 18 inc. 1500 Yes Aequisition25 70 
Trusts 
.oo- .• 80 .20 .00 .05 .75 .15 .05 4 SI: ~ '){gr' Yes 11000 200 Yes· Merger· 13 37 
• oo .90 _ .10 .oo No Change J v:~P • Yes 450 6oo No NA 15 600 
*The numbers refer to the question number. Questioris 1-6 were (llllitted in this second study; question 9 is coded: (5) strongly 
agree; (4.) agree; (3) no opinion; (2) disagree; ( 1) strongly disagree._ -
..... 
I\J 
0\ 
Survey of Acquiring Companies 
1* 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
4 4 4 5 2 2 .05 .75 .05 .15 4 .20 · Yes Yes 4 4 6 V.P. 
4 4 4 4 2 2 .05 .80 .10 .05 2 No Fr:i;nge Yes 3 4 4 V.P. 
4 4 4 4 3 2 .10 .90 .oo .oo 3 No Fringe· No 4 2 Asst. Tre1:1. 
5 4 4 4 2 3 .50 .JO .10 .10 1 No Bonus Yes 5 5 3 V.P. 
5 4 2 4 2 4 • 15 • 60 • 20 • 05 2 No Salary No 4 4 2 Exec. V.P. 
"'* 
4 4 5 4 2 . 15 • 50 • 25 .10 4 .08 Yes Yes 4· 5 7 V.P • 
A 3 4 2 2 3 .05 .75 .15 .05 1 No Bonus 'No 5 4 22 Treas. 
5 4 2 4 3 5 .10 .75 .15 .oo 1 No Bonus Yes 3 4 10 Treas. 
4 2 4 4 4 2 .05 .75 .18 .02 1 No salary Y~s 4 4 10 V.P. 
4 4 4 2 2 3 .20 .60 .15 .05 2 No 3 4 8 V.P. 
4 4 5 3 4 4 .05' • 70 .20 .05 2 No Bohu:S No 2 4 4 &lpl<>yee Rel. 
4 4 5 4 3 4 .10 .40 .40 •. 10 1 No Bonus Xes. 1 ,4 4o Treas. 
5 5 5 4 2 4 2 .. No 2 5 3 Pres. 
4 4 2 4 2 2 • 00 • 90 • 10 • 00 3 No Bbnus Yes 3 .5 2 Indus. Rel. 
5 4 4 5 4 2 • 15 • 50 • 25 • 10 2 No Yes 4 5 28 V.P. · · 
4 4 4 3 2 2 • 05 • Bo • 15 • oo 2 No Salary No 1 5 7 Corp. Dev. 
5 5 4 5 2 .10 .65 .25 .05 3 No Statµs 4 5 5 
5 4 2 5 4 2 No Yes 3 3 Treas. 
4 4 2 4. 3 .15 .60 .20 .05 4 .20 Yes Yes. 4 4 15 V.P. 
4 5 -5 5 3 4 4 Yes Fringe ·Yes 5.· 2 82 V.P. 
4 5 4 4 2 4 2 No Yes 2 5 25 V.:P. 
5 4 4 4 -4 4 .20 .50 .20 .10 2 No Bonus ·Yes 2 5 Exec. V.P. 
4 4 4 5 2 2 2 No Bonus Yes 4 5 8 Pres. 
*The numbers refer to the. question number on··the questionnaire; questions 1, 2, J, 4, 5, 6, 9, 
13, 14 have coded answers: (5) strongly agree; (4) agree; (3) no opinion; (2) disagree; 
(1) strongly disagree; % in question 7 refers to stock plan, salary; bonus., s'tatus. in tllat order. 
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